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Executive Summary 
This is a formative evaluation of the Hewlett Foundation’s Early Learning Innovation Fund that began in 
2011 as part of the Quality Education in Developing Countries (QEDC) initiative.1 The Fund has four 
overarching objectives, which are to: promote promising approaches to improve children’s learning; 
strengthen the capacity of organizations implementing those approaches; strengthen those organizations’ 
networks and ownership; and grow 20 percent of implementing organizations into significant players in 
the education sector. The Fund’s original design was to create a “pipeline” of innovative approaches to 
improve learning outcomes, with the assumption that donors and partners would adopt the most 
successful ones. 
A defining feature of the Fund was that it delivered assistance through two intermediary support 
organizations (ISOs), rather than providing funds directly to implementing organizations. Through an open 
solicitation process, the Hewlett Foundation selected Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica to manage the 
Fund. Firelight Foundation, based in California, was founded in 1999 with a mission to channel resources 
to community-based organizations (CBOs) working to improve the lives of vulnerable children and 
families in Africa. It supports 12 implementing organizations in Tanzania for the Fund.2 TrustAfrica, based 
in Dakar, Senegal, is a convener that seeks to strengthen African-led initiatives addressing some of the 
continent’s most difficult challenges. The Fund was its first experience working specifically with early 
learning and childhood development organizations. Under the Fund, it supported 16 such organizations: 
one in Mali and five each in Senegal, Uganda and Kenya. 
At the end of 2014, the Hewlett Foundation commissioned Management Systems International (MSI) to 
conduct a mid-term evaluation assessing the implementation of the Fund exploring the extent to which it 
achieved intended outcomes and any factors that had limited or enabled its achievements. It analyzed the 
support that the ISOs provided to their implementing organizations, with specific focus on monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E). The evaluation included an audit of the implementing organizations’ M&E systems and 
a review of the feasibility of compiling data collected to support an impact evaluation. Finally, the 
Foundation and the ISOs hoped that this evaluation would reveal the most promising innovations and 
inform planning for Phase II of the Fund. 
The evaluation findings sought to inform the Hewlett Foundation and other donors interested in 
supporting intermediary grant-makers, early learning innovations and the expansion of innovations. 
TrustAfrica and Firelight Foundation provided input to the evaluation’s scope of work. Mid-term evaluation 
reports for each ISO provided findings about their management of the Fund’s Phase I and 
recommendations for Phase II. This final evaluation report will inform donors, ISOs and other 
implementing organizations about the best approaches to support promising early learning innovations 
and their expansion. The full report outlines findings common across both ISOs’ experience and includes 
recommendations in four key areas: adequate time; appropriate capacity building; advocacy and scaling 
up; and evaluating and documenting innovations.  
Overall, both Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica supported a number of effective innovations working 
through committed and largely competent implementing organizations. The program’s open-ended nature 
avoided being prescriptive in its approach, but based on the lessons learned in this evaluation and the 
broader literature, the Hewlett Foundation and other donors could have offered more guidance to ISOs to 
avoid the need to continually relearn some lessons. For example, over the evaluation period, it became 
increasingly evident that the current context demands more focused advance planning to measure impact 
on beneficiaries and other stakeholders and a more concrete approach to promoting and resourcing 
potential scale-up. The main findings from the evaluation and recommendations are summarized here: 
                                                       
1 QEDC was an initiative ensuring that children learn to read, calculate and begin to think critically by the end of third grade. Funds 
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation supported it. 
2 This report uses “implementing organizations” to refer to Innovation Fund grantees that received support from the two Fund ISOs. 
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1. Adequate Time 
Allow time for start-up of both the ISOs and the implementing organizations’ management of 
grants to achieve realistic and adequate project implementation. Many implementing organizations 
did not have sufficient time to pilot their interventions. In several instances, when implementing 
organizations were ready to test their innovations, they had only one school year or less to measure 
changes in learning outcomes. During that period, many implementing organizations were adapting their 
innovations based on lessons learned. Assessments did not reflect consistent input and probably under-
reported the benefits of the innovation if it had been applied exactly as intended. In an ISO model to 
manage funds, start-up occurs on two levels. The first is the start-up of the ISO’s management of the 
fund; the second is the start-up of the fund’s implementing organizations. Delays in an ISO’s project start-
up will have a ripple effect on the whole project, resulting in reduced time for implementing and testing 
innovations. If, in spite of all efforts, start-up does overrun, one strategy to mitigate the negative effects 
might be the early agreement of a low- or no-cost extension to enable the testing of innovations to be 
implemented as planned. While a one-size-fits-all time scale does not exist, the approach adopted needs 
to fit into the time allocated. This could mean a nine-month start-up phase that includes both ISO and 
implementing organization start-up. ISOs should assess and account for factors that influence the time 
required for each phase. 
Donors should pay close attention to the timing and sequencing of activities. Coordination between 
the implementing organizations is difficult to achieve, especially when they follow different school 
calendars. For instance, some implementing organizations received funds after the school year had 
started, which negatively affected their ability to implement their program. The same can be said about 
M&E-related activities. On several occasions, M&E technical assistance came too late and baselines did 
not take place until after the program began. Assessments should conform to the implementing 
organizations’ program cycle, which may not align with the funding cycle. 
2. Appropriate Capacity Building 
Donors should ask explicitly for an indication of an ISO’s proposed capacity-building strategies in 
response to the initial call for proposals. Understanding the ISOs’ capacity-building approach will help 
donors assess whether adequate budget and resources have been allocated. A requirement for 
institutional capacity building, where needed, would indicate that donors are concerned with the 
sustainable development of the organizations they support. It would also facilitate a discussion around 
how capacity building can contribute to a program’s effectiveness.  
ISOs are advised to measure institutional and project-focused capacity-building needs through a 
standardized institutional assessment tool that will permit monitoring institutional change over 
time. Assessing the institution should include the implementing organization’s participation. Priorities, 
targets and a vision for where the implementing organization wants to be in one, two and three years 
should be established. An effective approach is the use of a standard assessment tool that enables key 
personnel to discuss and score their organization against a set of criteria. The ISO facilitates the use of 
the tool, which is repeated at different project stages to track areas of improvement and those needing 
additional attention. Firelight Foundation uses an effective, interactive, Excel-based organizational 
development tool. Once priorities and appropriate strategies are identified, it is important to ensure that 
adequate resources are allocated to enable these priorities to be met.  
3. Advocacy and Scaling Up  
Donors should require specific strategies related to an ISO’s expansion or scaling approach. 
Neither the Firelight Foundation nor TrustAfrica had explicit scaling-up strategies that outlined their 
approach to supporting the expansion of effective innovations. While the Fund was designed to create a 
pipeline of innovations that could be tested and passed along to other donors to fund their expansion, the 
Hewlett Foundation did not explicitly request that each ISO present a scaling-up strategy. ISOs made 
assumptions on how scaling may occur, but made limited progress in securing donor recognition and 
support for effective innovations.  
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ISOs and donors should ensure that national-level stakeholders, particularly ministries of 
education and education development partners, are aware of the project at the outset of design 
and start-up. Based on the literature review completed as part of this evaluation, innovations should be 
planned from the beginning in partnership with national ministries of education. At the outset of the 
project, both ISOs and the Hewlett Foundation had limited understanding of the importance of the 
national government and donor interface. Funding organizations should offer more advice to ISOs on 
advocacy and communication with other relevant donors and government to facilitate the eventual 
expansion of promising innovations. Firelight Foundation focused its attention at the community level due 
to its community-based design approach. This link with local education officials is important, and local 
officials often can serve as champions of the innovation at a regional or national level. TrustAfrica helped 
its partners interact with relevant donors. Both ISOs connected their funded implementing organizations 
to each other through joint training workshops, email lists or virtual platforms to share innovations and 
lessons learned. However, neither organization made it a priority to engage directly with the national 
government. This was regrettable; no matter how small the interventions, education ministries are the 
statutory bodies responsible for children’s education and must ultimately take responsibility any education 
reform’s implementation.  
Donors should consider having ISOs conduct a political economy analysis of the target country’s 
basic education sector to support more strategic and effective interventions. The Fund design did 
not emphasize the importance of understanding and influencing the enabling environment. ISOs focused 
on the implementing organization programs and relationships between them, rather than how different 
actors in the system could support or prevent their wider adoption. The literature on scaling up social 
innovations emphasizes the importance of “enabling conditions” in determining a model’s scalability.3 
Education innovations do not take place in a political and economic void. The literature review explains 
that political economy analysis is critical in understanding the financial and political context into which an 
innovation will be introduced. These factors will have tremendous influence over the potential for a 
national ministry and partners to take programs to scale.  
4. Evaluating and Documenting Innovations  
A full-scale impact evaluation will rarely be appropriate for innovations implemented at a small 
scale. Any proposed impact evaluation needs to be planned prior to the launch of a project. It should 
account for guidance that ISOs and implementing organizations provide, so that the basic criteria and 
methodology for assessing outcomes are integral to overall planning, implementation and budget. This 
did not occur with the Fund. The variety of innovations and approaches to assessing learning outcomes, 
small sample sizes (only one to five intervention schools or early childhood learning centers) and lack of 
consistent control groups or baseline data led to this evaluation’s conclusion that an impact evaluation 
would not be viable.  
Donors should communicate their M&E expectations clearly and base them on the implementing 
organization’s capacity. The ISOs had only partial success in delivering relevant and effective M&E 
technical assistance to implementing organizations. TrustAfrica emphasized learning results assessment 
using control and treatment groups, which was not appropriate for several implementing organizations 
and contexts. The level of analytical rigor that the organizations tried to achieve did not reflect the 
organizations’ existing M&E capacity, and many of the necessary conditions, like the sample size and 
timing, were not in place. Therefore, it is important that M&E technical assistance appreciate and 
incrementally build upon an organization’s assessment practices. For instance, if an organization collects 
anecdotal information from direct observation, M&E support may focus on development of an observation 
grid that helps an organization collect and score that information in a systemic manner.  
Documentation of the model and qualitative approaches of evaluation are recommended to 
assess effectiveness of small-scale innovations. For such pilot projects, qualitative approaches 
drawing on interviews with parents, community members, teachers and students can complement the sort 
                                                       
3 Cooley and Linn (2014) identify the following key enabling conditions: financial, natural resource and environmental, policy, 
institutional capacity, political, cultural and partnership.  
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of quantitative assessment of changes to learning outcomes that many Firelight Foundation and 
TrustAfrica implementing organizations use. These results will provide the data to assess which 
innovations are sufficiently successful to move to a larger stage of implementation in 30–50 schools, at 
which point an impact evaluation becomes more feasible. There are inevitable tensions between enabling 
experimentation and establishing baselines to rigorously test learning outcomes to justify taking an 
innovation to scale. Documentation and sharing of successful and not so successful innovations is 
particularly important at different stages of the development process since it serves to make learning 
available to the wider development community. It can save time and resources if others are able to draw 
and build on what has already been learned.  
The Hewlett Foundation has agreed to a second and final grant for the two ISOs. Key recommendations 
from this evaluation are that ISOs should highlight and provide ongoing support for the most promising 
innovations and focus on disseminating information about the innovations and advocacy to attract support 
for scale up where this seems appropriate. This should include ongoing capacity building support to 
enable implementing organizations to fulfil their role with increasing effectiveness and consolidate their 
learning from the project. 
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Introduction 
The report contains four chapters. Chapter 1 describes the Hewlett Foundation’s Early Learning 
Innovation Fund and the purpose of this evaluation. Chapter 2 assesses Firelight Foundation and 
TrustAfrica’s overall approaches in managing the Fund and a summary of key points from the literature 
review conducted as a part of this evaluation. Chapter 3 offers lessons learned and recommendations 
based on four categories and Chapter 4 highlights some of the most promising innovations identified as a 
part of this evaluation. 
Chapter I: Setting the Scene 
Program Description 
The Hewlett Foundation established its Early Learning Innovation Fund in 2011 as part of the Quality 
Education in Developing Countries (QEDC) initiative,4 which aimed to improve learning outcomes. The 
Hewlett Foundation’s original design for the Fund sought to identify, support and foster effective 
education innovations and thus create a “pipeline” of small projects that it and/or other donors could take 
to scale. Thus, the funds were quite open-ended, with an assumption that government or other funders 
would take up effective innovations. 
Innovation was defined to include both incremental and disruptive innovations. Incremental innovations 
are those that improve, adapt or apply a model for quality education and learning that occurs in a new 
setting, with a new population or in response to a new problem. Disruptive innovations are those that 
provide an uncommon opportunity to deliver learning in a distinctly new way. The Fund had four 
intermediate outcomes, which were to: 
1. Identify or foster promising approaches to improving children’s literacy, numeracy and critical 
thinking in and out of school. Assess learning results and cost-effectiveness. 
2. Strengthen the capacity of small and medium-sized organizations to assure children’s learning 
and to have strong voices advocating for learning at the local and district levels. 
3. Strengthen civil society education networks, ownership and engagement. 
4. Over the long term, grow at least 20 percent of sub-grantee organizations into significant 
education sector players at the state or national level. 
A defining feature of the Fund was that it delivered its assistance through two intermediary support 
organizations (ISOs), rather than directly funding the implementing organizations. Through an open 
solicitation process, the Hewlett Foundation selected Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica to manage the 
Fund. Firelight Foundation, based in California, was founded in 1999 with a mission to channel resources 
to community-based organizations (CBOs) working to improve the lives of vulnerable children and 
families in Africa. It supported 12 implementing organizations in Tanzania for the Fund. TrustAfrica, based 
in Dakar, Senegal, is a convener that seeks to strengthen African initiatives to address the continent’s 
most difficult challenges. The Fund was its first experience working specifically with early learning and 
childhood development organizations. Under the Fund, it supported 16 such organizations: one in Mali 
and five each in Senegal, Uganda and Kenya. 
  
                                                       
4 QEDC was an initiative ensuring that children learn to read, calculate and begin to think critically by the end of third grade. It is 
implemented in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
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Table 1: Overview of ISO Portfolios 
ISO Implementing organizations Target populations Innovations 
Firelight 
Foundation 
(Tanzania) 
$1,225,000 
12 Tanzanian 
NGOs  
(funding withdrawn 
from one) 
Pre-primary children attending 
early childhood development 
(ECD) centers 
Primary school children 
teachers, parents, communities 
Emphasis on community-
based interventions to 
support children’s literacy 
in school 
TrustAfrica 
(Senegal, Mali, 
Kenya, Uganda) 
$1,500,000 
16 organizations 
including INGOs, 
NGOs and CBOs 
(funding withdrawn 
from one) 
Predominantly primary school 
children, teachers, parents 
Emphasis on mother-
tongue literacy and 
bilingual education: 
curricula, methodology 
and teaching/learning 
materials development 
and testing 
Note: The dollar amounts in the column on the left correspond to the grant’s total value over three years.  
Evaluation Purpose 
At the end of 2014, the Hewlett Foundation commissioned Management Systems International (MSI) to 
conduct a formative evaluation assessing the implementation of the Fund over its first three years, 
exploring the extent to which intended outcomes were achieved, and factors that had limited or enabled 
achievements. It analyzed the support that the ISOs provided to their implementing organizations, with 
specific focus on M&E. The evaluation included an audit of the implementing organizations’ monitoring 
and evaluation systems and the data collected to determine whether an impact evaluation would be 
feasible and valuable. Finally, the Foundation and the ISOs hoped that this evaluation would reveal which 
of the innovations were most promising, and inform planning for Phase II of the Fund. 
The evaluation findings are intended to inform the Hewlett Foundation and other donors interested in 
supporting ISOs, early learning innovations and the expansion of innovations. TrustAfrica and Firelight 
Foundation provided input to the evaluation’s scope of work as the evaluation was expected to help both 
organizations learn from their experience and plan for the next phase of their grants. 
Evaluation Methodology 
MSI consulted with the Hewlett Foundation and an advisory committee of early childhood development 
and early grade learning specialists to develop the evaluation process. A mixed-methods approach was 
used that included: a literature review of best approaches for ISOs and scaling-up of social innovations; 
an online survey of implementing organization personnel; an analysis of national education contexts; and 
a comprehensive review of project documents. An evaluator traveled to Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya and 
Uganda and interviewed staff from Firelight Foundation, TrustAfrica and 24 implementing organizations, 
as well as education specialists and representatives from ministries of education. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and ISOs’ Approaches 
Chapter 1 summarized the purpose of the Early Learning Innovation Fund and this evaluation. In this 
chapter, we assess Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica’s overall management approaches, both from a 
technical design perspective and in budgeting. First, we will present the key findings of the literature 
review that help to inform our assessment of Fund management. 
Literature Review 
Before beginning field work, MSI conducted a literature review in December 2014 (Annex 1) to provide a 
theoretical framework, against which we could draw conclusions and recommendations. 
Specifically, we found that an ISO is effective when it: 
• Communicates well with donors, community-based groups and other partners; 
• Assesses the institutional and programmatic needs of smaller CSOs; 
• Develops, delivers and evaluates appropriate capacity-building strategies; 
• Understands the implications of power relationships, governance issues and participation; 
• Understands donor requirements and objectives; 
• Coordinates financial and narrative reporting so that information and funds flow effectively to 
enable program activities to progress; 
• Coordinates shared learning and advocacy so that government and national-level actors are 
aware of and, where possible, involved with innovation; and 
• Evaluates the most promising innovations, encouraging and facilitating plans to expand them. 
The need for ISOs derives from a single organization’s lack of the financial and social capital 
needed to achieve its desired goals. Intermediaries provide a link between grassroots activities 
and the larger socio-political systems and institutional structures in which they are embedded. … 
Intermediaries typically fulfill functions such as organizational capacity building, institutional 
development, staff training, research and advocacy, collection and dissemination of information 
and networking.  
– Sanyal, 2006, quoted in MSI’s Literature Review for the 
Early Learning Innovation Fund Evaluation 
In addition to the findings related to ISOs, we identified the following most salient points on scaling up 
social innovations: 
• Innovations need to be designed and implemented from the outset of activities in coordination 
with the national ministry of education and national partners in education; 
• Political economic analysis is an important step in understanding the potential of and interest in 
an innovation to be taken to scale. Analysis should include: financial and environmental, policy, 
institutional capacity, political context, cultural context and current donor and implementer 
partnerships and innovations; 
• Evidence helps determine whether an innovation should be scaled and is ready to scale; 
• Monitoring and evaluation helps organizations fine-tune their programs as well as advocate to 
other stakeholders; and  
• Innovations are more likely to scale when they build off existing systems. 
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Overall Approaches 
The different approaches of the Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica demonstrate alternatives to consider 
when designing and scaling up innovations. Table 2 gives a brief overview of each ISO’s program 
design, capacity-building support and assumptions on expansion: 
Table 2: Summary of Overall Fund Management Approaches 
Project Aspect Firelight Foundation TrustAfrica 
Type of innovations 
supported 
Largely community-based, focused on 
early childhood development 
Largely school-based, within formal 
education system 
Institutional capacity 
building 
Standard organizational development tool 
used to identify and prioritize needs and 
measure progress. National consultants 
contracted to do the identified training and 
follow-up. 
Did not offer training for institutional capacity 
building, but supported implementing 
organizations with technical capacity to 
improve interventions and measure learning 
improvements. 
Programmatic capacity 
building 
Adaptation/ training for tools to measure 
changes in learning outcomes (Uwezo for 
primary and ZamCAT for pre-primary) 
Peer learning opportunities at training 
workshops hosted by implementing 
organizations that shared their innovations 
Support for monitoring and evaluation 
development tailored to each innovation 
provided by technical consultant field 
visits/e-mail support 
Peer-learning opportunities through virtual 
community of practice and international 
workshops 
Assumptions about 
how scale-up would 
happen 
Lateral/organic spread within and across 
communities and between implementing 
organizations 
In the longer term, government or other 
donors would pick up successful innovations 
and take them to scale 
Capacity Building 
According to the literature review, capacity building is one key service an ISO can provide to 
implementing organizations. The following section explores the key findings on the two ISOs’ capacity-
building approaches. 
Capacity building was an important component for both ISOs, although Firelight Foundation and 
TrustAfrica adopted substantively different approaches. Firelight Foundation had a broad approach 
to assess and develop the institutional capacity of the implementing organizations addressing eight 
domains. It used a flexible seven-year partnership model to build institutional capacity based on a 
participatory needs assessment and prioritization of identified needs. TrustAfrica’s capacity building was 
more focused on project management, monitoring and evaluation. It achieved this through two major 
channels: 1) Technical assistance that a consultant provided on M&E and early learning and 2) Creation 
of a virtual network to share best practices, which Senegalese NGO ImaginationAfrika was tasked with 
managing.  
Both ISOs conducted organizational assessments to inform their capacity-building support. 
Firelight Foundation facilitated organizational assessments where organizations would measure 
themselves along eight domains: identity and agency; child rights; structure and function; strategy and 
programming; relationships; human resources; financial resources; and governance, leadership and 
To understand how a pilot project could be expanded, it is insufficient to know that it worked in one 
context. Donors must perform the due diligence of understanding the political economy of the context in 
which the innovation or pilot will be implemented. While it is tempting to devise and study pilots as a way 
of understanding what might work at scale, the act of scaling up can pose political economy obstacles 
that a small pilot does not encounter.  
– Chandy et al., 2013, quoted in MSI’s Literature Review for the 
Early Learning Innovation Fund Evaluation 
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management. Capacity development plans were based on the weakest areas and those that were seen 
as the most important to that organization’s personnel. TrustAfrica conducted an initial needs assessment 
as part of its application process. That assessment informed capacity-building plans, which were tailored 
to increase each organization’s capacity to implement its project and to measure learning outcomes. 
The Hewlett Foundation needs a broader approach to achieve its desired outcome of organizations 
becoming significant education players. However, the more narrow project-focused capacity-building 
approach has merit, either as a first phase of broader capacity building or in prioritizing limited resources. 
Use of Financial Resources 
Neither organization had the appropriate amount of resources available for capacity building. 
Firelight Foundation was unable to recruit a lead partner organization or consultant to manage the 
capacity-building activities. This left the onus on the program director, who ended up being overstretched. 
The program director was the only person who conducted annual visits to and field work with the 
implementing organizations. Firelight Foundation has since resolved those personnel issues. TrustAfrica 
relied on a consultant, who had only eight days a month to support 14 organizations in four countries. 
The largest portions of funds were allocated to the grants and staffing, with varying amounts allocated 
for capacity building, monitoring and evaluation and overhead costs. TrustAfrica’s budget was more 
limited in allocation of capacity building and its consultant was unable to provide the required support. 
This also says something about the ambitious nature of the TrustAfrica design. In retrospect, 
TrustAfrica’s senior staff said they would narrow their geographic focus to provide better support in the 
future. The most noticeable gap in the funding allocations of both ISOs was the lack of provision for 
advocacy and national networking. While some of the capacity-building budget supported implementing 
partner networking and shared learning, this fulfills a distinctly different need. It did not have the purpose 
of making sure innovations were embedded in the wider national education framework. 
Table 3: Breakdown of ISO Budgets 
 
Note: The TrustAfrica pie chart is based on actual expenditures through March 2015. The Firelight Foundation pie 
chart is based on its 2013–2014 budgets.  
64%
1%
13%
15%
7%
Breakdown of TrustAfrica's Budget
Grants
Scoping
Technical 
assistance
TrustAfrca staff
TrustAfrica 
overhead
45.30%
13%
5%
3%
25%
9%
Breakdown of Firelight's Budget
Grants
ZamCAT
Consultant costs
Firelight travel
Firelight staff
Firelight overhead
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Chapter 3: Lessons Learned and Recommendations 
In this chapter, we provide recommendations for the management of future early learning innovation 
funds with respect to the use of ISOs and scaling of innovations. Each recommendation cites background 
and findings to support it. 
Adequate Timing 
A common challenge for both ISOs was the short period available for piloting interventions. By the time 
implementing organizations were able to start testing their innovation, most had a school year or less to 
measure changes in learning outcomes. During the same period, many implementing organizations were 
refining and improving their innovations; when they had evaluations, they did not show the results of 
consistent input and probably under-reported the benefits of the innovation applied in an optimal fashion. 
Future early learning innovation funds should follow these recommendations regarding project timing and 
start-up. 
Allow adequate time for startup — both of the ISOs’ management of grants and of the implementing 
organizations — to achieve realistic and adequate project implementation. Using an ISO model to 
manage funds, start-up occurs on two levels: the start-up of the ISOs’ management of the fund and the 
start-up of the fund’s implementing organizations. Delays in an ISO’s project start-up will have a ripple 
effect on the whole project, resulting in reduced time for the implementation and testing of innovations. If, 
in spite of all efforts, start-up does overrun, one strategy to mitigate the negative effects is the early 
agreement of a low- or no-cost extension to enable innovations testing as planned. While a one-size-fits-
all time scale does not exist, the adopted approach needs to fit within the time allotted. This means that 
proposed activities need to be realistic, given the time available. ISOs need to assess the time needed for 
their own and their implementing organizations’ start-up and implementation, as well as a consolidation 
end phase. Factors that influence the time required for each phase need to be identified, analyzed and 
taken into account. While the desired duration of a funding cycle depends on numerous factors, Table 4 
provides some guidance. 
Table 4: Realistic Timeframe for Grant Start-up and Implementation 
Key phases in working through 
intermediaries to test innovations Duration Factors that can influence the time allowed 
ISO start-up (recruitment, informing 
appropriate authorities, selecting 
organizations, planning capacity building, 
initial workshop for implementing 
organizations, grant dispersal) 
6+ months 
1. Preliminary contextual research may require additional 
time 
2. Recruitment can take longer than planned – recruit and 
network early on in proposal 
Implementing organization start-up 
(recruitment, procurement, initial 
stakeholder engagement) 
3+ months 
1. Same as above 
2. Working in formal school system will take time in 
approvals and coordination with ministry of education 
3. Remote areas or poor internet access will require more 
time 
Main implementation phase (testing 
and measuring the results, capacity 
building, advocacy and communications) 
2-3 years 
1. The length of one program cycle: an innovation intended 
to have an impact on the first three years of primary 
education ideally needs to run for three years 
Consolidation 
(Disseminating synthesis of program 
results, capitalize on advocacy, plan for 
next phases) 
6 months 
1. Any second phase of funding should pick up as quickly 
as possible after the first ends to avoid losing project staff 
and stakeholder confidence 
Donors should pay close attention to the timing and sequencing of activities. Coordination between 
implementing organizations is difficult to achieve, especially when they are following different school 
calendars. For instance, some implementing organizations received funds after their school year had 
started, which negatively affected their ability to implement their program. The same can be said about 
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M&E-related activities. On several occasions, M&E technical assistance came too late, with baselines 
being conducted after the program had begun. Assessments should conform to the implementing 
organizations’ program cycle, which may not align with the funding cycle. 
A more detailed timeline for project start-up and implementation is in Annex 3. 
Appropriate Capacity Building 
Implementing organizations are likely to have both institutional and project-related capacity-building 
needs. ISOs need understand both and have a carefully considered strategy to support either type of 
capacity building — or, ideally, both. Donors need to ask for the specific approach that ISOs will take in 
building the capacity of implementing organizations and the types of tools that will measure institutional 
development over the course of the intervention. 
Institutional capacity building develops an organization’s long-term effectiveness and sustainability, 
typically focusing on issues such as governance, monitoring, evaluation and learning and advocacy. 
Institutional capacity building is an opportunity to invest in civil society’s stake in national development 
from community-level work to influencing national policy. The Firelight Foundation showed itself to be 
particularly strong in this respect. It worked with implementing community-based organizations and non-
government organizations through a flexible seven-year partnership model. This strengthened 
institutional capacity using a participatory needs assessment to prioritize that organization’s needs. 
Examples of Firelight Foundation’s capacity building include training for management bodies to improve 
governance and helping partners to improve their monitoring and evaluation strategies to build reliable 
data based on measurable outcomes and a clear theory of change. 
Project focused capacity building is directly related to the effective implementation of the project itself, 
to support the achievement of its stated objectives. This was the focus of TrustAfrica’s capacity building. 
It addressed the implementing organizations’ capacity to effectively measure changes in learning 
outcomes being realized as a result of the innovations being tested. Implementing organizations learned 
a more impact-oriented approach to project monitoring and evaluation than many were accustomed to; 
they also received advice and support to develop tailored monitoring and evaluation methodologies for 
each innovation. This resulted in a number of comprehensive assessments of the changes in learning 
outcomes attributed to each specific innovation. TrustAfrica focused its resources to expand its limited 
experience of working in primary education through valid measurement of learning outcomes, which was 
central to achieving project objectives. Firelight Foundation took a different approach to project-
focused capacity building. It identified and adapted common tools (Uwezo and ZamCAT) to measure 
learning outcomes for primary and pre-primary innovations, respectively.5 
Future early learning innovation funds should follow these recommendations regarding institutional 
capacity-building: 
Donors should ask explicitly for an indication of an ISO’s proposed capacity-building strategies in 
response to the initial call for proposals to ensure that the institutional capacity of implementing 
organizations will be assessed and that appropriate capacity building is part of the ISO’s program 
planning and budgeting. A requirement for institutional capacity building would indicate that donors are 
concerned with the sustainable development of implementing organizations. It would also facilitate a 
discussion around capacity building and the role it will play in the program concerned. If donors have a 
clear understanding of this, they are more likely to agree on a suitable budget. 
                                                       
5 The Uwezo assessment tool was initially designed as a large-scale, nationally representative household survey to assess the basic 
literary and numeracy competencies of school-aged children across Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Zambian Child Assessment 
Test (ZamCAT) was developed in 2010 as an early child development instrument to assess the abilities of preschool Zambian 
children in nonverbal cognition; receptive and expressive language; fine motor skills; information processing; executive function; 
socio-emotional development; and task orientation. Firelight Foundation adapted the tool to the Tanzania early childhood 
development context. 
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ISOs are advised to assess institutional and project-focused capacity-building needs through a 
standardized institutional assessment tool, which will allow monitoring institutional change over time. 
Assessing an institution should take place with the implementing organization’s participation. Priorities, 
targets and a vision for the implementing organization in one, two and three years should be established. 
An effective approach is a standard assessment tool that enables a group of key personnel to discuss 
and score their organization against a set of criteria. The ISO facilitates the use of the tool, which is 
repeated at different stages of the project to track areas of improvement and areas that still need 
attention. Firelight Foundation uses an effective interactive, Excel-based organizational development tool. 
It allowed organizations to visualize how they scored along different organizational development criteria 
and how they progressed in those areas over time. After identifying priorities and appropriate strategies, it 
is important to ensure allocation of adequate resources to enable meeting these priorities. 
Advocacy and Scaling Up 
Both ISOs connected their funded implementing organizations to each other through joint training 
workshops, email lists or virtual platforms to share innovations and lessons learned. However, both ISOs 
did limited work to connect implementing organizations to larger-level national education structures, such 
as the ministry of education and other relevant education partners. These linkages are important in terms 
of the need to advocate for education reforms and to increase awareness of the need for new and 
effective education approaches. Advocacy is also critical to any effective expansion strategy. The 
literature review conducted for this evaluation noted the importance of ISOs’ advocacy for both reform 
and scaling-up purposes. Advocacy allows ISOs to connect grassroots organizations to larger socio-
political systems and institutional structures in which they are embedded (Sanyal 2006). The ISOs made 
some efforts in this regard. However, this was not an overall priority. Both TrustAfrica and Firelight 
Foundation did not truly engage national structures, especially the ministries of education. While these 
structures are not expected to be deeply involved at the pilot stage, they are responsible for ensuring 
access to quality education and, as such, should be informed from the outset and on a periodic basis. 
Early involvement makes it easier to gain later buy- in.  
For future early learning innovation funds, we recommend the following: 
Donors should require specific strategies related to an ISO’s expansion or scaling approach. 
Neither the Firelight Foundation nor TrustAfrica had explicit scaling-up strategies that outlined their 
approach to supporting the expansion of effective innovations. While the Innovation Fund was designed 
to create a pipeline of innovations that could be tested and passed along to other donors to fund their 
expansion, there was no explicit request for each ISO to have an explicit scaling strategy. ISOs each had 
assumptions on how scaling would occur. However, they made limited progress in securing donor 
recognition and support for effective innovations. 
ISOs and donors should ensure that national stakeholders, particularly ministries of education 
and education development partners, are aware of the project at the outset of design and start-up. 
Based on the literature review completed for this evaluation, innovations should be planned from the 
outset in partnership with national ministries of education. Both ISOs and the Hewlett Foundation had 
limited understanding of the importance of the national government and donor interface at the outset of 
the project. Funding organizations should offer more advice to ISOs on advocacy and communication 
with other relevant donors and government to facilitate the eventual expansion of promising innovations. 
Firelight Foundation focused its attention at the community level due to its community-based design 
approach. TrustAfrica worked with CBOs and national and international NGOs and did facilitate 
communication with some other relevant donors. However, neither organization made it a priority to 
engage directly with government. This was regrettable; however small the interventions, education 
ministries are the statutory bodies responsible for children’s education and must ultimately take 
responsibility for implementing any education reform.  
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Evaluating and Documenting Innovations 
The Hewlett Foundation and the ISOs recognize the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in 
identifying, supporting and promoting the expansion of promising innovations. However, lack of clear 
M&E guidelines from the Hewlett Foundation led ISOs to adopt distinct assessment approaches. The lack 
of guidance also made ISOs unsure if the Hewlett Foundation expected an impact evaluation for each 
innovation or across the various innovations the implementing organizations managed. The Firelight 
Foundation adopted the Uwezo tool to measure learning progress among early grade beneficiaries and 
the ZamCAT to measure changes in school readiness skills for preschool beneficiaries. They emphasized 
training for implementing organizations to use these tools and share results of tests with parents and 
community members. In this way, implementing organizations saw the tools as an innovative way to gain 
insight into the cognition of learning and to share immediate results with parents. In addition to training 
the implementing organizations to use the tools, Firelight Foundation also retained teams of consultants 
to conduct baseline testing across a sample of early learning centers and primary schools. 
TrustAfrica took a different approach to measuring implementing organizations’ progress. They retained 
one consultant to provide assistance to implementing organizations in designing a quasi-experimental 
learning assessment approach, testing students in both pilot and comparison groups.  
Given the diversity of the innovations, the variety of languages and the small sample size, it is not feasible 
to conduct any type of impact evaluation for this Fund. For future early learning innovation funds, we 
recommend the following: 
The design of M&E assistance should result from a needs assessment and understanding of the 
operating environment. M&E assistance carries a risk of responding to donor requirements, rather than 
an implementing organization’s needs. This was evident with the use of logical frameworks, which may 
have been introduced prematurely or with not enough guidance for some implementing organizations. 
M&E assistance should be sequenced so that organizations first are able to articulate their theory of 
change, and then can translate in a logical framework to guide their activities. There was also the issue 
with organizations already having M&E systems that contradicted the guidance provided under the Fund. 
In these situations, M&E technical assistance should not attempt to establish a parallel M&E system, but 
rather build off what is already there.  
Donors must provide guidance on monitoring and reporting expectations for any intervention with 
improved learning as its outcome. The Hewlett Foundation provided limited guidance to its ISOs on 
expectations around monitoring of learning outcomes. Both ISOs provided resources, technical support, 
and time to conduct standardized learning assessments. However, issues around quality of sample and 
sample size impede the ability to conduct quality evaluations with credible impact attribution. 
A full-scale impact evaluation will rarely be appropriate for innovations being implemented at a 
small scale. Any proposed impact evaluation needs to be planned prior to a project’s start. It should take 
into account guidance from funders, ISOs and implementing organizations, so that the basic criteria and 
methodology for assessing outcomes are integral to overall planning, implementation and budget. This 
did not occur for the Innovation Fund. The variety of innovations and approaches to assessing learning 
outcomes, small sample sizes and lack of consistent control groups or baseline data led to the conclusion 
that an impact evaluation would not be viable.  
Documentation of the model and qualitative approaches of evaluation are recommended to 
assess effectiveness of small-scale innovations. For such pilot projects, qualitative approaches 
drawing on interviews with parents, community members, teachers and students can complement the sort 
of quantitative assessment of changes to learning outcomes that the Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica 
implementing organizations used. These results will provide data to assess which innovations are 
successful enough to move to a larger stage of implementation in 30–50 schools, at which point an 
impact evaluation becomes more feasible. Tensions are inevitable between enabling experimentation, 
establishing baselines and rigorously testing learning outcomes to justify taking an innovation to scale. 
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Documentation and sharing of successful and not-so-successful innovations is particularly important at 
different stages of the development process, since it makes learning available to the wider development 
community. It can save time and resources, as others are then able to draw and build on what has been 
learned. Documentation of each innovation needs to be detailed enough to be useful but succinct enough 
to ensure that key points are readily available. It might include descriptions of context, presenting issues, 
the innovation, key stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities, qualitative and quantitative effects on 
beneficiaries and their learning outcomes and particular successes, challenges and lessons learned. A 
point of contact for further information should also be included, as well as a photograph. 
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Chapter 4: Promising Innovations 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the Early Learning Innovation Fund and the rationale for this 
evaluation. Chapter 2 assessed the ISOs’ overall approaches and highlighted key points from the 
literature review. Chapter 3 presented recommendations for future early learning innovation funds based 
on lessons learned. In this chapter, we highlight some of the promising innovations supported by Firelight 
Foundation and TrustAfrica. The scope of this evaluation did not include a rigorous assessment of each 
innovation. However, field interviews and document review provided the evaluation team with enough 
information to establish a preliminary selection of programs based on the following criteria: 
1. Particularly innovative or comprehensive program models. 
2. Relative success in assessing learning results or M&E practices, mostly with standardized before-
and-after assessments showing improvements in learning outcomes. 
3. Stakeholder engagement and ownership, primary at a local-level. 
These criteria were based on some of the salient points identified in the literature about scaling up social 
innovations. However, as mentioned, some of those key points — like engaging national stakeholders 
and conducting political economic-type analyses — did not feature in any of the innovative programs. 
We also chose to feature three diverse implementing organizations from each ISO for all project countries 
(except Mali). The Organization for Community Development (OCODE) and Safina Women’s Assocition 
(SAWA) are community-based NGOs. Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA) is a national-
level NGO. Société Internationale de Linguistique (SIL) and Link Community Development (LCD) are 
international NGOs. Madrasa Resource Center, Kenya (MRCK) is a community-based program of the 
Aga Khan Foundation.  
Table 5 provides an overview of the selected models (with further description in Annex 2). Note that 
innovative aspects may not always be novel. Rather, social innovation can entail applying proven models 
in a new context, like the example of remedial classes for OCODE in Tanzania. 
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Table 5: Promising Innovations 
Organization/Country Program Model or Theory of Change Learning outcomes Stakeholder Buy-in Innovative Aspects 
The Organization for 
Community Development 
(OCODE) – Tanzania 
Training teachers in reading, writing and 
arithmetic for slow learners. Providing 
teaching aids and materials. Establishing 
and equipping remedial classes. 
Sensitize parents to get involved in the 
learning struggles of their children. 
Based on before/after assessment: 
-Pupils who can read a story in Swahili 
went from 18% to 77% 
-Pupils who can read letters in English 
went from 33% to 97% 
-Pupils who pass mathematics test went 
from 22% to 56% 
-Parents in the community 
contributed cash to the 
program. 
- Schools outside intervention 
zone asked to use the model. 
Use of SMS to 
engage and 
sensitize parents 
Tanzania Home 
Economics Association 
(TAHEA) – 
Tanzania 
If youth mobilize parents and 
communities to support numeracy and 
literacy skill development, the literacy 
and numeracy of children in primary 
school will improve. 
No standardized assessment of learning 
outcomes took place, but TAHEA had 
one of the stronger M&E frameworks. 
-Adults in communities were 
beginning to see youth as 
part of the solution, rather 
than the problem. 
-Engaging youth. 
Combining 
children’s literacy 
with youth 
development. 
Safina Women's 
Association (SAWA) - 
Tanzania 
If the Mvomero District Council is 
actively engaged in ECD policy, budget 
planning and evaluation processes at 
the community level, ECD centers will 
have more resources for service delivery 
and child learning outcomes will 
improve. 
No learning data. 
SAWA uses Uwezo and ZamCAT tools. 
SAWA is the accredited trainer for 
Uwezo in Morogoro region and trained 
other Firelight Foundation implementing 
organizations to use the tools. 
Community engagement 
model. Local government 
authorized land use for 
school construction. 
Community members 
contributed building materials 
and were involved in 
managing the ECD centers. 
Promoting ECD 
and establishing 
centers where they 
did not previously 
exist. 
Société Internationale de 
Linguistique (SIL) – 
Senegal 
Increase learning outcomes by creating 
a program to facilitate the transfer of 
reading skills from L1 (mother tongue) to 
L2 (French). 
Before-after comparison with baseline 
that was conducted after project start. 19 
evaluation criteria. Overall positive 
results compared to treatment group. 
Average score in print awareness went 
from 5.3 to 10.37 for treatment and 4.63 
to 8.42 for control. 
Advocacy has included 
national-level authorities. 
Contact with other bilingual 
education models. 
Bilingual education 
model using Serer 
and French. 
Madrasa Resource 
Center, Kenya (MRCK) 
Classroom and community-level 
interventions focused on improving 
teaching and learning practices and 
teachers’ tools for literacy assessment 
and supporting and encouraging 
parents’ participation in reading with and 
for their children. 
The endline study indicated positive 
gains in reading scores for pupils at both 
KG2 and KG3 levels in comparison with 
the control groups, but few of the 
findings were statistically significant. 
There were criteria where the control 
group performed better. 
Works with county education 
authorities around Mombasa 
to implement ECD centers. 
Teaching reading at 
the pre-school level 
with children as 
young as 3. 
Link Community 
Development (LCD) – 
Uganda 
LCD worked in 16 schools, facilitating 
eight school performance reviews and 
training for 16 literacy teachers, 16 
school management committee 
members and 16 parent/teacher 
association members. 
Example from EGRA: At baseline, P1 
pupils could read 0 words correctly in 
English and Runyoro. At endline, the 
average was 2.7 (English) and 1.6 
(Runyoro). 
Organizes annual stakeholder 
meetings with all 
stakeholders, including the 
Ministry of Education. 
School 
performance review 
measurement tool. 
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Conclusions 
Both Firelight Foundation and TrustAfrica supported a number of effective innovations working through 
committed and largely competent implementing organizations. The program’s open-ended nature avoided 
being prescriptive in its approach, but based on the lessons learned in this evaluation and the broader 
literature, the Hewlett Foundation and other donors could have offered more guidance to ISOs to avoid 
the need to continually relearn some lessons. For example, over the period of the evaluation, it became 
increasingly evident that the current context demands more focused advance planning to measure impact 
on beneficiaries and other stakeholders and a more concrete approach to promoting and resourcing 
potential scale-up. 
The Hewlett Foundation has agreed to a second and final grant for each of the two ISOs. Key 
recommendations from this evaluation are that ISOs should highlight and provide ongoing support for the 
most promising innovations and focus on disseminating information about the innovations and advocacy 
to attract support for scale-up where it seems appropriate. This should include ongoing capacity-building 
support to enable implementing organizations to fulfill their role, increase effectiveness and consolidate 
their learning from the project. 
This report has made a number of recommendations to assist the Hewlett Foundation and other donors 
working through ISOs to support innovation and the scale-up of promising approaches. Donors can 
provide some useful general guidance, without becoming prescriptive, to assist ISOs in developing 
interventions. Such guidance might include: 
• An expectation that institutional and project-focused capacity-building needs of implementing 
organizations will be assessed using a standard tool, and that a capacity-building plan will be 
established, funded, implemented and evaluated as part of the project. 
• An expectation that ISOs will, at a minimum, introduce the planned innovations to ministries of 
education, keep them informed and updated on innovations being tested and, where possible, 
involve government representatives in implementation and discussions concerning the 
innovations. 
• A requirement for a political economy analysis of the national education sector detailing relevant 
policy and active partner activities, networks and stakeholders. This would be completed prior to 
ISOs’ selection of implementing organizations. This political economy analysis will provide insight 
to the ISOs in helping to identify some of the unique innovations with potential to scale.  
• An expectation that ISOs will provide a strategy for the scale-up of successful innovations. 
• Clear guidance about any monitoring and evaluation requirements and whether an impact 
evaluation will be required so that appropriate provision can be made from the beginning of the 
project to conduct baseline testing. 
While donors will have some constraints that influence their proposed funding period, this needs to be 
based on a realistic assessment of the time required for each phase of the project, with discussion of 
contingency plans to mitigate any delays that occur. This is an example of the need for donor awareness 
of the power dynamics between donor and grantee. As the agency with ultimate control of funding, 
donors need to make space for more frequent, ongoing and structured dialogue to ensure that ISOs do 
not attempt to meet unrealistic objectives in a given time. Approaching the dialogue in the spirit of 
collaborative learning and adapting will help to facilitate an open and honest discussion with ISOs. 
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Managing and Disseminating 
Innovation through Intermediaries 
Introduction 
The critical role of civil society organizations (CSO) in international development gained wide recognition 
in the late 1980s, and their role has steadily increased since. However, a number of factors have 
persistently inhibited CSOs’ ability to support and empower disadvantaged groups and facilitate 
sustainable social transformation. These barriers include a lack of organizational management capacity; 
an overreliance on and accountability to international donors; and difficulties in encouraging governments 
to take successful innovations to scale and link them with larger-scale policy and decision-making. 
Intermediary organizations emerged to link international donors and, to some extent, governments, with 
community-based organizations (CBO) and initiatives. The relationships between intermediaries and 
other actors are not always linear or hierarchical. The potential for intermediaries to support social 
change lies in their understanding of the systems they inhabit and their ability to affect them. 
CSOs also play an important role in the design and piloting of innovations, many of which have proved 
effective and transformative at the community level. However, it has proved to be more difficult to 
introduce such innovations into national policy and still more challenging to bring them to scale on the 
ground. 
In the first part of this literature review, we examine how intermediary organizations influence systems 
and support diverse actors to meet common goals. We highlight lessons learned to assist donors with 
effectively engaging intermediaries and look at the roles, skills and capacities required by the parties 
concerned. In the second part of this literature review, we examine processes based on lessons learned 
for the expansion and dissemination of innovation. 
Effective Models for Selecting, Managing and Supporting 
Intermediaries 
Defining the intermediary organization and what it 
does  
Intermediary organizations can be thought of as “conduits of 
resources” (Vogel and Fisher 2008), since they are first and 
foremost resource organizations for others. The main distinction 
between traditional, charitable nongovernment organizations (NGO) 
and intermediary organizations is that intermediaries provide 
resources to other actors who implement social programs instead 
of directly to the ultimate beneficiaries of those programs. Information is one of the important resources 
channeled and influenced by intermediaries, which act as buffers and interpreters of diverse cultures 
and perspectives, ideally enabling donors and community groups to better understand each other. 
The need for intermediaries derives from a single organization’s lack of the financial and social capital 
needed to achieve its desired goals. Intermediaries provide a link between grassroots activities and the 
larger socio-political systems and institutional structures in which they are embedded (Sanyal 2006). This 
function sets them apart from their client CSOs that support service delivery or advocate for specific 
causes. Intermediaries typically fulfil functions such as organizational capacity building, institutional 
development, staff training, research and advocacy, collection and dissemination of information, and 
networking (Sanyal 2006). Resources that intermediaries provide can be divided into four broad 
categories: funding, technical assistance, training, and information and research. 
Four Primary Resources 
Intermediaries Provide 
1. Funding 
2. Technical  
3. Training 
4. Information and Research 
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From the perspective of international donors, intermediaries are usually seen as pass-through 
organizations for the provision of resources that enable local organizations to affect change. Using local 
intermediaries rather than providing direct assistance to CBOs is perceived as a more manageable, 
effective and sustainable approach to building local capacity to achieve social change. However, 
intermediaries can be perceived as a necessary evil rather than as a critical link in a chain of 
relationships, and this perception can inhibit donors from seeing support for their effective operation as a 
valid use of resources. 
Often, but not always, intermediaries are CSOs that support other CSOs. The intermediary role can be 
played by different actors at different points within multi-directional exchanges and flows of information 
(Fisher and Vogel 2008). Intermediaries can be research institutions, foundations or private companies. 
And, a single intermediary can have clients that are international organizations, national organizations 
and grassroots groups. For example, Netherlands-based Aflatoun (discussed in more detail below) works 
with smaller-scale CSOs; international NGOs, such as U.K.-based Plan International; and the government 
of Egypt (Amur and Munk 2014). 
The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI),6  ,1 a participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool 
for civil society around the world, enables us to define intermediary organizations in comparison to 
other types of CSOs. It divides citizens’ organizations into three categories: mutual benefit, public 
benefit or pretenders. Intermediaries fall into the category of public-benefit organizations — defined as 
being formed by one group of citizens to benefit other groups of citizens, often with support from third 
parties (Holloway 2001). Within that broad category, intermediaries are CSOs that provide capacity-
building support, networking, research and representation. 
Intermediaries have been established as specialist support organizations to help less-developed CSOs 
build their institutional, organizational and technical capacities (Holloway 2001). They act as networking 
organizations, coordinating activities of other CSOs and developing CSO networks; research and think 
tanks on specific issues to support NGOs, business and local or national government; and representative 
CSOs that help others liaise with government institutions. These functions are not exhaustive; 
intermediaries often work across these categories, and nonintermediary CSOs can take on these 
functions as well. 
In international development, much of the literature on intermediary organizations focuses on their 
capacity-building function and the different modalities for providing that service to client CSOs (Ashman et 
al, 2011). The most frequent modality is through training but can also encompass periodic support for 
planned organizational learning and change processes, facilitating exchange visits among groups that 
implement similar programs, sponsoring conferences, and providing Web-based programs. The degree of 
formality of capacity building also varies from structured courses or programs offered to other CSOs to 
informal capacity building through information sharing and networking (Ashman et al, 2011). 
Research and think tanks are sometimes referred to as information or knowledge intermediaries and are 
especially well-suited for promoting innovation. They generate, interpret, organize and communicate 
research-based information for a particular group for a social purpose (Fisher and Vogel 2008). They help 
establish a communication structure and enabling environment that invites the use of evidence in policy 
and practice. Thus, at their most effective, intermediaries do not just communicate information from one 
actor to another, they interact with stakeholder groups through varied communication channels to 
engage in the interpretation of information and use it to co-create new knowledge. They reinforce 
successful programs, identify challenges and support learning from experience. 
One example of how some of these functions come together in practice is provided by the U.S. 
government’s Social Innovation Fund (SIF), which uses grant-making intermediaries to competitively 
select nonprofit organizations to develop promising, evidence-based solutions in economic opportunity, 
healthy futures and youth development (Shah and Jolin 2012). Intermediaries use their relationships with 
innovative social programs and their flexibility and ability to manage risk to connect government funds 
                                                       
6 Accessible at www.civicus.org/index.php/en/csi/123-introduction-to-the-csi. 
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with socially driven organizations, enabling the federal government to fund promising innovations (Smith 
2009). 
SIF intermediaries collect and assess evidence on 
potential grantee programs to advise the federal 
government on how it should allocate funds, thus 
supporting the federal government in good stewardship of 
taxpayer dollars. Intermediaries evaluate program potential 
and effectiveness and make investments accordingly. 
SIF’s tiered grant- making approach is designed to give 
more money to organizations with proven impact, while not 
excluding organizations that lack the evidence for their 
impact. The three grant categories (fig. 1) correspond to 
the strength of the evidence that exists for that particular 
program. In developing countries as well, differentiated 
grant making allows donors and intermediaries to reach 
CSOs with limited management capacity (Tembo et al 
2007). 
SIF evaluation criteria are based on grantees’ past and planned evaluations. Flexibility toward the actual 
evidence a potential grantee has or plans to collect avoids excluding nascent programs and 
organizations. However, certain sectors and types of programs risk being disadvantaged, such as those 
doing advocacy work where impact can be more difficult to measure (Abramson et al 2012). 
Linking bureaucratic grant-making processes with emerging social innovations is not without its 
challenges and requires reconciling diverging cultures. In the SIF example, a peer-review process was 
used to evaluate and approve government grants. Such systems are typically used to prevent 
government agencies from allocating federal grant awards in biased ways, as opposed to maximizing 
quality decision-making or improving the value of programs (Shah and Jolin 2012). The result is that 
investment analysis best practices cannot easily be used in the allocation of government funds. To be 
effective in this system, intermediary grant-making organizations need to push the government to adapt 
evaluation practices to the requirements of investing in social innovations. This requires going beyond 
paper applications and allowing enough flexibility for further analysis of evidence, consultations with 
potential grantees and site visits. 
The in-depth analysis of social investments that intermediaries can provide is akin to the services that 
marketing information services provide for the retail sector (Smith 2009). In other words, they can assess 
and develop advice on the quality and efficacy of emerging social innovations, which can both inform 
governments and donors on how to allocate their money and educational institutions on whether they 
should adopt that particular program. Thus, intermediaries create a common source of information for 
policymakers, donors and practitioners/implementers. 
There is also the question of how intermediary organizations participate in and influence the decision- 
making processes of the initiatives they are involved in. The World Bank has long been aware of the 
importance of this role — seeing CSOs as important intermediaries in World Bank-funded projects that 
depend on participation and capacity building at the community level. Successful collaboration depends 
on identifying an organization with appropriate characteristics and involving its staff in decision-making 
from as early as possible in the project cycle. Steps must be taken to prevent World Bank or government 
requirements from undermining the participatory orientation of the CSO and, where necessary, to 
strengthen its capacity, encourage cooperation among CSOs, and support communication between 
CSOs and government. (Carroll, Schmidt and Bebbington 1995). This recognizes the power dynamics 
within a program and the importance of enabling intermediary organizations to represent and advocate for 
marginalized groups. 
Where poverty reduction, investment in human resources and environmental management are 
concerned, projects increasingly depend on participation and capacity building at the community level. 
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Participatory, community-based development depends in turn on intermediary organizations with the 
specialized skills and experience to provide links between community-level institutions on the one hand 
and national and international institutions on the other. The intermediary functions include facilitating 
communication between project beneficiaries and government; helping to identify and voice community 
needs; supporting participation and group formation; training and building the capacity of community 
groups; and channeling resources to the community level. 
We have seen that relationships and systems are essential components of the role that intermediary 
organizations take on. In this next section we look at the environmental conditions that affect the form that 
intermediaries take and their relative success. 
Intermediaries and systems 
An analysis of the systems in which an organization operates is useful when determining whether and 
how to engage with that organization. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 2011 
Forward Reform Agenda focused on building capacity of local actors with the idea that “to invest 
insustainability, the Agency must have a greater capacity to nurture lasting institutions, systems, and 
capacities in developing countries that enable them to confront development challenges effectively” 
(USAID 2011). 
This reform agenda has manifested itself in two ways: first, through increased funding being disbursed 
directly to local organizations and, second, increased adoption of a systems-thinking perspective in 
alignment with the Agency’s Local Systems Framework. This states that “the focus on local systems is 
rooted in the reality that achieving and sustaining any development outcome depends on the 
contributions of multiple and interconnected actors. Building the capacity of a single actor or 
strengthening a single relationship is insufficient” (USAID 2014). 
This second interpretation encourages international donors to intervene in a way that leverages systems 
as a whole as opposed to focusing on capacity building for individual organizations. Thus, donors might 
think of themselves as conveners and enablers rather than simply as providers. In this case, a local 
intermediary organization can play a critical part in stimulating and supporting local actors who are 
committed to reform and social progress. However, since intermediary organizations are often dependent 
on external funding, donors need to consider supporting and building an organization’s capacity to sustain 
its operations after a project ends in the same way that intermediaries need to build sustainability into 
their work with their grantees. 
Ultimately, the intermediary organization’s ability to connect key players in a network is a strong indicator 
of its effectiveness and credibility. One would have to also look at the quality of those connections and 
whether they are placing organizations in a better position than they were without the network. In the case 
of the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a critical element of its effectiveness was its 
success in linking international donors with grassroots groups (Sanyal 2006). Governments and donors 
gain from their relationship with intermediaries by being able to improve the reach of their services and 
programs to disadvantaged groups. Grassroots groups benefit from new resources allowing them to carry 
out their goals. 
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PRIA is an international center for learning and promotion of citizen participation and democratic 
governance used by NGOs, governments, donors, trade unions, private business and academic 
institutions. It focuses on citizens’ empowerment through promoting access to rights and entitlements, 
including basic services in health, education and water; women's literacy and livelihoods; forest rights of 
tribal peoples; land rights; and occupational health and safety. 
PRIA's theory of change comprises three interrelated elements: 
• Mobilization and collectivization of citizens prepares them in becoming informed and active. 
• Creating coalitions of countervailing power such that pressure to energize and 
reform governance is generated. 
• Influencing governance institutions to become accountable to their mandates and citizens. 
PRIA's strategy comprises: 
• Supporting knowledge enhancement and capacities for active citizenship. 
• Facilitating building of collectives and associations of citizens so that their voice is amplified. 
• Enabling civil-society partnerships and alliances to engage governance institutions. 
• Convening multi-stakeholder dialogues in the public and private spheres. 
• Advocating to support participation and democratic governance. 
PRIA operationalizes its strategy through: 
• Enabling micro-macro and macro-micro linkages that create strong support for 
influencing various actors. Therefore, PRIA works at the grassroots level to evolve 
innovations that are scaled up provincially, nationally and globally. 
• Developing and nurturing relationships with grassroots actors and systematizing 
practical knowledge. 
• Promoting capacity building through distance education, structured events, field exposure 
and information dissemination. Undertaking transnational initiatives based on the principles 
of south-south cooperation. 
 
PRIA's expertise in management of social development programs comprises 
participatory approaches in planning, monitoring and evaluation, gender audits, training and 
human resource development, strategic planning, legal and financial planning, organizational 
development, team building, policy analysis and advocacy, building coalitions and networks. 
 
 
Accountability is a common challenge in defining operational arrangements between actors. An 
organization tends to serve the interests of those to whom it is accountable (Caroll et al 1995). In 
principle, the intermediary organization should be accountable to the local organizations it serves and to a 
lesser extent to those organizations’ ultimate beneficiaries. However, in reality, donor funds are tied with 
reporting requirements, which can contribute to a patron/client relationship with the intermediary 
organization (Holloway 2001). Evidently, this misguided accountability compromises the intermediaries’ 
intended purpose, which is to support organizations or programs that address the needs of 
disadvantaged groups and, when taken to extremes, can encourage donor driven initiatives. 
In each system, forces working for and against social progress compete with one another, creating an 
environment that is more or less conducive to innovation and social progress. The education sector in the 
United States was created to value stability over adaptation. Promising innovations occur not because of 
the system, but in spite of it (Smith 2009). Innovative programs do not happen in a vacuum. To gain 
traction, they must be carried out in parallel with a realignment of incentives and priorities of those within 
the system, which includes policymakers, rules, and regulations in addition to users, buyers, investors, 
and researchers (Smith and Peterson 2011). 
One way to realign incentives and unify actors around a common purpose is through public-private 
partnerships. For SIF, public-private partnerships were built in from the beginning in the way a grant 
would be disbursed. Each federal dollar granted is matched by the intermediaries and then again by their 
sub-grantees with money from private and other non-federal sources, thereby increasing the return on 
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taxpayer dollars and strengthening local support (Shah and Jolin 2012). By virtue of investing in the 
solution, multiple actors demonstrate their commitment and converge around the investment and its 
intended purpose. However, such coordination and collaboration demand a fairly high capacity from all 
the actors involved and may be ambitious in less developed countries where communication 
infrastructure and levels of education are more limited. 
The USAID-funded CSO Sustainability Index assesses key components of a country’s civil-society sector 
and the forces working for and against the ability of CSOs to operate successfully. One of the dimensions 
examined is the level of support provided to CSOs by intermediary support organizations. Those 
intermediary organizations are seen as important in providing local sources of funds; training and 
mentoring programs to CSOs and the ability to network, share lessons learned and advocate for policy 
reform around sector-specific areas. 
International development interventions adopt a systems approach to varying degrees. One promising 
example from Indonesia is the Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI), which is a 15-year project between the 
governments of Indonesia and Australia. Although it is too early to say whether the KSI is successful, it 
shows a thoughtful approach to engaging a system through targeted engagement with intermediary 
organizations. KSI seeks to improve the quality of public policies by making better use of research, 
analysis and evidence. In this case, the system is the national knowledge sector which includes the 
government, universities, consulting firms, grassroots organizations and the media. 
The intermediary organizations are the research institutions or universities that disseminate knowledge to 
inform policymaking processes. The project’s theory of change is if the capacity of knowledge producers 
(i.e., the intermediaries) is increased and there is a strong demand for knowledge to formulate policies, 
then evidence-based policies that benefit citizens will be realized. Accordingly, the project’s first phase 
focuses on the supply side of knowledge, which entails building the capacity of intermediaries and 
strengthening their networks, facilitating a dialogue around a shared vision, promoting information policy 
reforms, building constituencies, and commissioning studies. The project’s second phase will focus on the 
enabling environment, or demand side, promoting tax incentives, procurement regulations, and university 
reform. This project model acknowledges that sustainability depends on intermediary organizations that 
are capable of promoting social progress, as well as a legal environment that is conducive to their 
operation. 
KSI also shows the importance of national policies and ownership at the national-government level. The 
government of Indonesia was engaged from the beginning in the project design, which increases the 
likelihood that gains will be integrated into national institutions. Indeed, a successful project does not 
automatically lead to national adoption for a number of reasons. One reason is policymakers’ lack of 
experience with poverty or innovation and their tendency to base decisions on direct experience and 
professional training (which may work against incorporating new sources of evidence), political pressures 
and multiple and competing demands in limited amounts of time (Fisher and Vogel 2008). These 
significant hindrances to advancing social progress should not be underestimated and need to be taken 
into account in project design and ongoing implementation. 
Intermediaries are best defined as actors who support the enabling environment and they should be 
evaluated accordingly. However, evaluations of intermediary organizations have tended to focus on the 
funded projects rather than the organizations themselves (Nye & Glickman 2000). Donors and 
foundations have focused on the results of grantees, which has failed to capture the full impact of 
intermediaries on community development systems (Chavis 2002). Instead, it may be more appropriate to 
design, monitor and evaluate programs in terms of the intermediary’s capacity to affect positive changes 
on the local system in which it operates. 
The Association for the Study and Development of Community’s six components of community capacity 
can be used as a framework for assessing an intermediary’s impact on a community’s (or other system’s) 
capacity to facilitate social change (table 1 below). 
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Component Explanation 
Systemic 
Learning 
The ability of a network of organizations to generate and use information for planning, 
decision making and capacity building. 
Adequate Human 
Capital 
Access to and engagement of individuals with the expertise and skills to provide leadership, 
implement practices, increase resources, promote learning, enhance policies, and promote 
collaborative relations. 
Effective 
Practices 
Use of strategies, programs, and procedures that appropriately and effectively address the 
aspirations and needs of communities. 
Supportive 
Policies 
Existence of public and institutional rules, regulations, and laws that can support social, 
economic, and community development. 
Collaborative 
Relations 
Use of networks among community organizations and between the community and external 
systems toward the increases in systemic learning, adequate human capital, effective 
practices, supportive policies and sustainable resources (e.g. social capital). 
Sustainable 
Resources 
Access and use of financial, technological, and training opportunities to support 
sustainable and successful community change. 
Table 1. Association for the Study and Development of Community’s Six Components of Community Capacity. 
Another useful framework for evaluating impact on a system comes from empirical evidence in the health 
sector, where four key areas to assessing successful network development (table 2) have been identified 
(Ashman 2003). These areas address how actors relate to one another and network building based on 
these principles takes time. Monitoring and evaluation needs to look at how the network is functioning 
with regard to these criteria in addition to the actual performance of the network. 
Area Explanation 
Preexisting 
Social 
Capital 
Groups or networks of people and organizations with common objectives that share a history of 
working together, with relationships characterized by mutual trust and common norms that facilitate 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
Strategic Fit 
1. Goals address needs and issues perceived to be significant by all of the important participants 
and stakeholders 
2. Methodology based on a successful model for addressing needs that is shared by the 
partners and major stakeholders. 
3. Partners are not competitors. Activities represent a meaningful value-added to the organizational 
portfolio of each partner. 
4. The functional roles of the partners are complementary. 
 
 
Shared 
Control in 
Governance 
and 
Management 
Network designers can review and select alternative models for sharing control based on the 
purpose of collaborating, the level of preexisting social capital, available resources, and expected 
timeframe. Partners can be represented at the policymaking level, whether formally or informally. 
Operational management coordinates (rather than directs) member activities. Members and 
partners feel they can influence major decisions, depending on the established network rules. 
Transparency among donors, intermediaries and sub-grantees builds trust and allows actors to 
see how funds are contributing to the network’s goals and what challenges need to be 
addressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor 
Relations 
• Donors provide support that facilitates autonomy avoiding over direction and unilateral 
control. 
• Relationship mechanisms are flexible, promote mutual accountability, and avoid burdensome 
reporting and one-way accountability. 
• NGOs communicate goals, objectives, and activities to donors to act consistently with one 
another and do not simply do what the donor wants. 
• Program managers realize agreements with groups of NGOs take more time than those with 
a single organization. 
• Donor agencies realize that the more they take the lead in defining the goals, targets, 
partners, and outcomes, the more they will tend to drive the network and lessen chances for 
ownership and sustainability. 
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Table 2. Four Key Areas to Assessing Successful Network Development.7 
Social capital was particularly important for PRIA, an intermediary organization that provided capacity- 
building support to other CSOs. Its ability to establish a cohesive network of CSOs was due in significant 
part to encouraging some of its longtime associates to establish organizations that would then act as its 
partners (Sanyal 2006). The extent to which an organization is present and has strong relationships with 
other actors will inevitably affect its ability to engage with and mobilize those organizations toward 
common goals. When selecting intermediary partners, donors should look at those organizations’ record 
in working with CSOs, especially nontraditional groups (Tembo et al 2007). This would include assessing 
the quality and power dynamic of the relationship; how well an intermediary is representing the needs of 
its community-based partners and balancing these with the needs of the donor; the level of support and 
effectiveness of capacity-building activities; and degrees of sustainability after the partnership ends. This 
is particularly important where nontraditional groups are concerned, because their specific needs and 
circumstances cannot be automatically extrapolated from general experience. 
The literature identifies other elements that allow for positive engagement with systems. A first feature is 
self-awareness. Intermediaries need to be aware of how their “power of in-between” affects the flow of 
perspectives and sources of evidence into the research policy environment (Fisher and Vogel 2008) in 
addition to having the skills and experience to assess their client’s capacity-strengthening potential in 
terms of that organization’s mission, governance structure and reputation (Ashman et al 2011). 
How to assess an intermediary 
We now have an idea of the range of services and functions provided by intermediaries. We have also 
examined the systems in which intermediaries operate and their potential for influencing those systems. 
To effectively provide these critical services and functions, intermediaries themselves need a particular 
set of skills and competencies and donors and other partner organizations need to be able to assess the 
degree to which intermediaries will effectively meet their needs. Based on the literature reviewed, we 
have identified that intermediaries need to be able to 
• Communicate well with donors, community-based groups and other partners; 
• Assess the institutional and programmatic needs of smaller CSOs; 
• Develop, deliver and evaluate appropriate capacity-building strategies; 
• Understand the implications of power relationships, governance issues and participation; 
• Understand donor requirements and objectives; 
• Coordinate financial and narrative reporting so that information and funds flow effectively to 
enable program activities to progress; 
• Coordinate shared learning and advocacy so that government and national-level actors are aware 
of and, where possible, involved with innovation; and 
• Evaluate the most promising innovations and encourage and facilitate plans to expand them. 
These skills and competencies can be assessed by looking at an intermediary organization’s track record 
through its reports and publications and talking to previous partners at different levels 
(community/national/international). Intermediaries will have particular strengths based on their experience 
and may be keen to develop others. Foundations and other donors have a vested interest in helping 
intermediaries develop their skills to fulfil diverse and complex roles so that there is a growing pool of 
intermediary organizations capable of implementing initiatives with sustainable impact. 
In our 2011 discussion paper on intermediary support organizations (ISO) as partners in strengthening 
local civil society, MSI highlights the following initial criteria for selecting ISOs: 
• Established capacity in the areas related to program goals, e.g., conflict resolution, democracy 
promotion, organizational development, climate change adaptation, maternal child health, etc. 
                                                       
7 Adapted from “Towards More Effective Collaboration in NGO Networks for Social Development: ‘Lessons Learned’ from the NGO 
Networks for Health Project and a Framework for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” by Darcy Ashman, May 2003. 
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• An organizational mission and track record in building the capacity of other groups and 
organizations. Unless ISO leaders and staff understand the larger goals for civil society capacity 
building and share the desire to strengthen other groups, they probably will not develop the 
positive relationships with their clients that are necessary for successful capacity building. 
• Reputation with local NGOs and other civil-society groups, e.g., is the ISO well known and 
respected as a grassroots actor or is it seen as a group of urban intellectuals who lack community 
perspectives? 
• ISO governance and management capacity, e.g., will the ISO be able to manage the grant or 
contract requirements associated with its capacity building responsibilities? If it is going to make 
and manage grants to local organizations, is there separation between grant management and 
capacity building services? Will the board and senior management provide the needed overall 
direction? Are there any areas in which the ISO may need some strengthening? ISOs may be 
sound overall, but benefit from some upgrading of their skills, especially in newer programmatic 
areas like use of social media, anticorruption or climate change adaptation, or from some 
organizational strengthening of their own in areas like marketing or governance. 
The importance of governance and management capacity cannot be over emphasized, since it is this that 
provides the nuts and bolts of making any partnership function well, with ripple-out effects on program 
implementation and impact. If donors can be persuaded of their role in supporting capacity building for 
intermediary organizations, this will be a significant contribution to development resources and influence 
the way that intermediaries work with their sub-grantees. 
Once an intermediary has been selected, a discussion about its capacity and approach to fulfilling its role 
in the specific program concerned is an important prerequisite to starting work. This can serve to identify 
any areas that need strengthening and provide a forum for discussing how this might be done. Technical 
and organizational strengthening can be integrated to ensure that leadership and systems are prepared 
to support and manage new technical expertise. 
Donors also need to be aware of the dangers of fostering unhealthy competition among CSOs, which 
need to be working cooperatively and collaboratively to build effective civil societies. There is a need for 
strategies to avoid positioning local organizations against each other; particularly, asking intermediaries to 
sub-grant to or build the capacity of rival organizations seeking funds from the same sources. This may 
create a difficult dynamic for both parties. MSI suggests some proactive strategies to avoid these 
outcomes: 
• Match larger NGOs as ISOs with smaller and newer organizations; 
• Coordinate ISOs with NGOs according to regional location; and 
• Design the capacity-building activities to complement NGO activities, e.g., organize training of 
trainers, resource centers, convene thematic meetings, disseminate new technical or policy 
related information, etc. 
A further strategy may be to support the development of existing networks to enable them to build the 
capacity of their member organizations. As such, they are primarily accountable to their members and act 
as an access point to enable donors to reach organizations with expertise, interest and commitment to a 
specific aspect or area of development. In addition to playing an intermediary role to support the 
distribution of funding, such networks can also transmit information and support advocacy from the 
grassroots toward national and international decision-makers, thus fulfilling a short-term programmatic 
role and supporting the longer-term development of an active civil society. 
A further issue for consideration is the sustainability of intermediary organizations if they are simply seen 
as mechanisms for funding distribution rather than as critical links in the community of organizations 
working together to bring about change. This latter, healthier perspective gives value to capacity building 
and support so that organizations can sustain themselves even after program funding comes to an end. 
Having examined the roles and tasks of intermediary organizations and looked at some lessons learned 
with regard to their selection, how to work with them effectively and encourage their sustainability, we will 
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now discuss the dissemination and expansion of innovations that are often developed and tested by 
intermediaries and their partners. 
Expanding and Disseminating Innovations 
In this section, we explore how social innovations can be taken to scale, highlighting critical and recurring 
drivers, challenges, and lessons learned. While drawing from theoretical frameworks on this subject, we 
will focus on the literature’s implications for donors who seek to engage constructively in expanding social 
innovation. 
Defining social innovation 
Despite the ubiquity of innovation in policy discussions, few published articles on social innovation 
actually define the term. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore the nuances of the concept. 
However, we propose using the Stanford Social Innovation Review’s definition as a foundation. The 
definition states that an innovation must meet two criteria. “The first is novelty: Although innovations need 
not necessarily be original, they must be new to the user, context, or application. The second criterion is 
improvement. To be considered an innovation, a process or outcome must be either more effective or 
more efficient than preexisting alternatives” (Deiglmeier et al 2008). In other words, innovation is a 
process or outcome that is new and improved. 
Next, it is important to articulate what distinguishes social innovation from other types of innovation. The 
line dividing the two is blurry. Commercial or business innovations often produce social goods or positive 
externalities and, similarly, innovations in traditional social sectors, such as health or education, usually 
entail some form of private-sector involvement or commercialization. Nevertheless, there are two features 
of social innovation that help to set it apart from other forms. If one of the following applies, then an 
innovation can be said to be a social innovation: The first is that social innovation provides a service that 
government institutions would typically provide. Here, innovation is a novel way of delivering social 
services. Social innovation does not require government ownership or leadership, however. The second 
feature is that social innovations target poor or disadvantaged groups. This type of innovation may not 
necessarily be a novel product, but rather an improvement on its distribution and availability to those who 
would not be reached by commercial innovations alone. 
Finally, the Stanford Social Innovation Review article cited above includes the element of sustainability. 
This is particularly relevant to the discussion of innovation’s expansion and wide adoption. An innovation 
can be new and improve on an existing process or outcome. However, if it cannot be sustained 
financially, organizationally and environmentally over time, then its social purpose is questionable at best. 
Therefore, social innovations must be sustainable over time. 
Frameworks for Expansion 
Now that we have an understanding of what is social innovation, let us explore what it means to expand, 
disseminate or scale innovation. We first look at the types of organizations involved, the approaches and 
methods that can be deployed, and the necessary conditions for taking innovations to scale. 
First, there are three key and distinct organizational roles that are involved in scaling up: the originating 
organization, which develops and pilots the model; the intermediary organization, which assists the 
scaling-up process; and the adopting organization, which takes up the model.8 Too little attention is paid 
to the intermediary organizations. They are at the center of multi-stakeholder alliances and are 
responsible for critical aspects of scaling up innovation that other organizations are unable to do. A full list 
of the key intermediary organization functions is included in figure 2 below. 
The types of organizations that take on these three critical roles vary greatly. Private and public 
organizations and NGOs all play important roles in taking innovation to scale. Private sector actors bring 
                                                       
8 Cooley 2012 adapted from Simmons and Shiffman (2003) 
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the knowledge of the market. They are particularly well-placed to develop innovative pilots and assess 
business models, organizational processes, marketing, and investment packaging and placement. Public 
agencies are important for institutionalizing innovations. They also provide financing and assure that the 
policy, regulatory, and political environments are supportive. NGOs add value with their rich perspective 
on disadvantaged groups’ issues and needs, as well as the cultural realities and grassroots networks that 
will have to be leveraged for the innovation’s broad adoption. The continuum of partnerships between 
public and private organizations and CSOs can be seen in figure 3.9 
 
Figure 3. Actors Involved in Taking an Innovative Model to Scale. 
 
 
Figure 2. Continuum of Partnerships Between Public and Private Organizations and CSOs. 
 
After who, we must identify how innovations are taken to scale. MSI’s Scaling Up Framework identifies 
nine different methods of achieving scale, which fit within three overarching categories: expansion, 
replication, and collaboration (table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
9 Chandy et al 2013 
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Approach Method 
 
 
Expansion 
 Growth 
 Restructuring or Decentralization 
 Franchising 
 Spin-Off 
 
 
Replication 
 Policy Adoption 
 Grafting 
 Diffusion and Spillover 
 
Collaboration  Formal Partnerships, Joint Ventures, and Strategic Alliances  Networks and Coalitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.Types and Methods for Scaling Up.10 
The methods above are not mutually exclusive and are often used in tandem or in sequence with one 
another, especially for methods within a single approach. The varying degree with which the innovation’s 
originator remains involved in scaling up distinguishes these three approaches. The originating 
organization is most involved with expansion, which is increasing the scope of an organization that 
originally developed and piloted the social innovation. For an organization to expand an innovation, it fills 
a service provision gap and maintains a high degree of control. Replication involves increasing the use of 
a particular process by getting others to implement the model. Here, less control characterizes the 
originator’s relationship with other actors implementing the model. The relationships are especially diffuse 
and informal, especially with diffusion and spillover and mass media methods of scaling. Finally, 
collaboration is in between expansion and collaboration and includes formal partnerships between 
organizations as well as informal networks. In these varying structures, there tends to be some form of 
division of responsibilities among collaborating organizations. 
Innovation does not occur in a vacuum and there needs to 
be an innovation ecosystem that is conducive to the 
development, diffusion and adoption of new ideas. Scaling 
up approaches must be based on how the operating 
environment will enable or hinder the generation and 
dissemination of innovative ideas. 
The IFAD Scaling-Up Framework identifies four common 
drivers of innovation and eight spaces that need to “opened 
up” for the environment to be conducive to scaling up 
innovations (Hartman and Linn 2008). The drivers that are 
needed to push the scaling up innovation process forward 
are: 
• Ideas and Models. The idea or model must work at 
a small scale and must be attractive enough to drive 
diffusion. 
• Vision and Leadership. Leaders must be able to 
communicate that expanding a given innovation is 
necessary, desirable and feasible. 
• External Catalysts. Political and economic crises 
drive the need for innovation. 
• Incentives and Accountability. Rewards, competition and pressure are institutionalized so that 
actors are evaluated according to their relative contribution to the scaling-up initiative. 
The enabling conditions for scaling innovation can be divided in the following seven spaces: 
• Financial. Resource mobilization mechanisms need to be in place and goals need to be 
consistent with budgetary realities. 
• Natural Resource and Environmental. Impact on the environment should be considered and 
benefits to natural resources should be promoted. 
• Policy. Policy and regulatory frameworks should be permissive or can be adapted to support the 
innovation. 
                                                       
10 Ada Adapted from Cooley 2012.pted from Cooley 2012. 
There are conditions that allow 
innovators to see a problem in a new 
light, create potential solutions, refine 
their approach, and ultimately bring to 
scale effective ideas, products, 
processes, and platforms (Smith 
2009). 
For innovation to take hold in 
education, we need to make some 
significant changes to the way the 
education ecosystem’s wide array of 
stakeholders do their work, orienting 
them toward common goals and 
providing incentives for all of them to 
strive more effectively and 
collaboratively for approaches that 
create better outcomes for children 
and communities (Smith and 
Peterson 2011). 
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• Institutional Capacity. Organizations, institutions and human resources need to be sufficient or 
supported to carry the process forward. 
• Political. Critical political actors need to allow and preferably support scaling up efforts. 
• Cultural. Cultural support mechanisms should be leveraged and cultural obstacles should be 
mitigated. 
• Partnership. Partners need to be mobilized. 
These factors help donors determine which innovations should be taken to scale because, evidently, not 
every innovation can or should be taken to scale (Cooley and Linn 2014). Thus, it is important to use to 
assess several criteria before investing in scaling a particular innovation. In addition to the dimensions 
listed above, donors should look at an innovation’s level of evidence to determine its readiness to scale. 
Donors and other actors must assess whether an innovation delivers the socially desirable outcomes that 
it is intended to generate and do target users need and demand the innovation. 
The MSI Framework’s adaptation of the National Science Foundation’s evidence continuum (fig. 4) 6 can 
help donors and other actors determine whether an evaluation is ready to scale. It categorizes 
innovations according to their standard of evidence and argues that an idea should not be taken to scale 
unless it is established at the level of a good or best practice. As seen with SIF in the previous section, 
such a categorization is not only helpful for determining whether a program or innovation is ready for 
expansion, but also can help donors use evidence to calibrate their level of support. 
 
ractice 
 
•Minimal  •Anecdotal  •Positive  •Clear  •Evidence  •Proven; a 
Objective  Reports  evidence  evidence  of impact  "truism" 
Evidence    in a few  from  from  essential 
    cases  several  multiple  for 
 cases  settings  success 
  and meta-   
  analyses   
 
Figure 4. National Science Foundation Evidence Continuum. 
 
One of the underlying principles and important takeaways should be that scaling up is a process that 
demands a deliberate and systematic approach. MSI’s Scaling-Up Management Framework allows 
practitioners to translate the key features of scaling innovation discussed above into an operational guide 
with 10 concrete tasks within three steps (table 4 below). 
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Steps Tasks Key Questions, Tools, and Approaches 
 
1.
 D
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g 
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g 
U
p 
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1. Create a Vision 
ü What is being scaled? 
ü How it will be scaled? 
ü Who does what (organizational roles)? 
ü What is the scope? 
 
 
 
2. Assess 
Scalability 
ü Is there a need for this particular model? 
ü Is the model cost-effective? 
ü Are there economies of scale? 
ü Can contextual factors be replicated? 
ü What is unique and would need to be replicated? 
ü Do actors have the capacity and resources? 
ü Does the necessary funding exist? 
ü Compatibility of organizations’ cultural values of with the innovation 
 
 
3. Fill 
Information 
Gaps 
ü Documentation of model including goals and distinguishing technical, 
organizational, and process elements, demand for innovation 
ü Comparative analysis of costs 
ü Evaluation of the model’s impact and success 
ü Refinement and simplification of the model 
ü Key resources needed to transfer model 
 
4. Prepare a 
Scaling Up Plan 
ü Summary of the need 
ü The vision and evidence for the model 
ü Proposed actions, timetable, roles, and responsibilities, and resources needed. 
 
2.
 E
st
ab
lis
h 
Pr
ec
on
di
tio
ns
 fo
r 
Sc
al
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g 
U
p 
 
 
5. Legitimize 
Change 
ü Enlist prominent spokespersons and advocates 
ü Develop and popularize slogans and symbols 
ü Establish high-advisory boards 
ü Lead media and public education campaigns 
ü Conduct policy debates 
 
 
6. Build a 
Constituency 
ü Organize multi-stakeholder coalitions 
ü Work through political parties 
ü Engage legislative committees 
ü Outreach to businesses, religious groups, and other civil society organizations 
ü Mobilize grassroots networks and campaigns. 
7. Manage the 
Scaling Up 
Process 
ü Donor roundtables 
ü Budget hearings and transparency campaigns 
ü Fiscal decentralization 
ü Bridge financing and other market mechanisms 
 
3.
 M
an
ag
e 
Sc
al
in
g-
U
p 
Pr
oc
es
s 
 
8. Modify and 
Strengthen 
Organizations 
ü Apex organizations 
ü Conferences and retreats 
ü Business process reengineering 
ü Leadership development and coaching 
ü Continuous training. 
 
9. Coordinate 
Action 
ü Interim Secretariats 
ü Formal joint ventures and partnerships 
ü Performance based reimbursement plans, grants, and contracts 
ü Virtual networks 
 
 
10. Track 
Performance 
and Maintain 
Momentum 
ü Citizen oversight panels 
ü Public hearings 
ü Blue-ribbon panels, 
ü International monitoring groups, 
ü Listservs and Web-based dissemination 
ü Third-party monitoring 
ü Comparative scorecards 
ü Sustained media coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Scaling-Up Management Framework.11 
 
As seen in Hartman and Linn’s spaces and the MSI Framework, one of the critical points in assessing 
readiness to scale is the level of development of the organizational and institutional architecture required 
to support the innovation’s expansion. This concern is especially important in terms of the intermediary 
organization’s role in leading multi-stakeholder coalitions. Donors in the intermediary role must assess the 
capacity, willingness and appropriate positioning of leading organizations. Also, when organizations are 
leading social innovation, it is important that leadership be cultivated organizationally as opposed to 
relying on a single charismatic leader. A fundamental problem with leadership and values is that they will 
not last unless carefully nurtured (Hartmann and Linn 2008). 
                                                       
11 Adapted from Cooley 2012. 
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Savings Groups: An Innovation Taken to Scale Savings groups (SG) provide poor women with a 
secure place to save money, the opportunity to take out small loans, and a network of support and 
solidarity. Members also learn about malaria prevention. The over 7 million SG members worldwide 
demonstrate that the model is replicable. In Mali, randomized control trials and a qualitative 
longitudinal study indicate that women in SGs save and borrow more than other women, invest more in 
livestock (a critical asset for increasing resilience during shocks) and build stronger relationships with 
community members. The studies also reveal the model’s limitations. It increased knowledge of 
preventing malaria but had no impact on behaviors. It also had no impact on income, health or 
education. This begs the question of whether the model can be refined to create that impact or if 
parallel interventions addressing those areas more desirable. The studies also offer findings particularly 
important to the model’s scalability. They showed that providing formal training for “replicators” was a 
cost-effective way of increasing uptake. They also found that financially and socially active women were 
more likely to join groups, as more disadvantaged groups of women joined later on. Donors and 
implementers need to plan accordingly. They should implement and rigorously test adaptations to the 
model to find out what works best for ensuring that the model reaches the poorest of the poor (Saving For 
Change Report Summary, Oxfam 2013). 
 
 
Other times, organizations are not the main actors. Rather, it is the combined capacity of organizations, 
diffuse actors and value-added partnerships that contribute to an organizational landscape that can carry 
an innovation. The organizational lens is useful but not sufficient. Often, innovations are more diffuse 
and not easily understood in terms of organizational boundaries. In those cases, one must look at 
whether established systems and institutions can take on a similar function. 
While it is best for donors to be confident in the enabling organizations, systems and institutions, 
sometimes their suitability and capacity lags behind the innovation’s growth. This was the case in Niger 
with the expansion of an innovative approach to school 
8 Through its 10-year policy for education-sector development and its decrees, the government of Niger 
led the implementation of a new model for local school councils. It decided to expand the local school 
council model from 240 to 9,000 schools before this innovative approach was refined and standardized 
and before the systems to ensure functionality were put in place (Honda and Kato 2013). For instance, it 
was five years after it began that formal monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were put in place. 
Nevertheless, its success is demonstrated in that the local school councils continue to function and are 
ubiquitous in Nigerien society today, community engagement remains high, and primary admission 
rates have increased as a result. The model has also gained attention among neighboring countries, 
where up to 1,000 similar local school councils have been set up, and Niger is also continuing to expand 
as it looks to applying the model to preschools. Given the program’s achievements despite its risky and 
ambitious approach, a closer look at what contributed to enabling factors is warranted. 
The first major success factor was how the initiative went about monitoring and evaluation to address 
problems and identify what worked and what did not. In parallel with the local school councils, the 
government of Niger also established federations of councils, whose primary purpose was to monitor the 
implementation of school programs and to “share experience of school improvement activities through the 
[local school council] mechanism and to discuss concrete actions on important issues in the presence of 
major stakeholders” (Honda and Kato 2014). In addition, the monitoring function was deliberately given to 
the federations so as to not overburden the local school council administrators and managers with those 
duties. Not only was monitoring and evaluation valued, but its implementation was done in consideration 
of the varying capacity of actors and supported by functioning working procedures. 
Next, there were features of the local school councils’ standardized institution model that were paramount 
to its success. It was effective at bringing key stakeholders12 together and uniting them toward a 
                                                       
12 Stakeholders included teachers, parent teacher associations, moth parents, and other community members such as village chiefs. 
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common goal, based on principles of transparency, legitimacy, and genuine community engagement 
and participation. Transparency was manifest in the school action plans, which incorporated voices of 
local school council members and were approved by a community assembly. These aspects of the 
program had a broader impact on the openness of the political space, increasing the community 
participation and engagement necessary for supporting its continued expansion. 
Types of expansion 
We have defined social innovation and provided guidance on how to determine an innovation’s readiness 
to scale. Now, we will provide a more in-depth look at scaling-up models and examples, referencing MSI’s 
Scaling-Up Framework when appropriate. 
Franchising is an often-cited model for expanding social innovation. Social franchising is based on the 
commercial franchise model, where a central organization develops an operating model and then recruits 
franchisees to adopt that model (Amar and Munk 2014). Aflatoun is an educational program that teaches 
children social and financial skills. It started in 1,100 schools in India and now serves 21,000 sites in 
103 countries nine years later. To scale up, it used a centralized model with core principles that local 
organizations would adopt and make their own (Robinson 2014). 
One of the keys to Aflatoun’s success was its ability to extend ownership to its partners in a genuine 
way. Despite its centralized Amsterdam-based secretariat, franchisees have the freedom to adapt the 
program to their local circumstances. They are treated as equal partners, and policies allow them to 
shape the work of the secretariat. 
How Aflatoun Took its Innovation to Scale 
• A clear vision: If children are self- confident, socially responsible and financially competent, they 
will be in a position to improve their own lives and the world around them. 
• Market research and identification of a product niche 
• Dispel any expectations of top-down control and give partners the freedom to adapt to local 
circumstances 
• Develop a manual outlining core program principles and how to adapt to local circumstances 
• Evaluate the pilot program to understand what works and what does not, and update manual 
accordingly 
• Treat partners equally 
• Implement practices that allow partners to influence the work of the secretariat and vice versa 
• Decentralize training and quality assurance 
Ongoing challenges: 
• Balancing delegation and supervision 
• Managing partners’ expectations 
• Using partner feedback in secretariat level decisions based on 
• Creating space for lateral partner-to- partner collaboration 
• Systematically evaluating program quality instead of adopting the mentality that they can 
empower themselves based on their own experiences. 
 
Ownership is a typical challenge when expansion requires diverse organizations to implement a model. 
Sometimes, innovation does not spread, because central or originator organizations are unwilling to let 
go and delegate. However, the converse can also be true, when organizations are unwilling or 
unaccustomed to accepting ownership. Unfortunately, international development has too often adopted a 
welfare approach, breeding a culture of dependency and passivity of local organizations (Yachkashi 
2005). In these situations, organizations are reactive, waiting for others to empower them, instead of 
adopting the mentality that they can empower themselves based on their own experiences. 
For innovative social programs, a strong attention paid to producing and disseminating manuals and 
providing intensive training are fundamental to maintaining the core components of an innovation within 
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what may otherwise be a diffuse, organic and informal network. This was certainly critical in Aflatoun’s 
ability to connect its partners and ensure quality control. Another example is the Lions Club International 
Foundation’s Lions Quest Skills for Adolescence Program, which the Realizing Ambition Program 
replicated in the United Kingdom.13 One component of its strategy to ensure that the service was offered 
consistently was the dissemination of manuals and teaching materials and an intensive training program 
focused on experiential learning. Recognizing that the ability of its trainers to train other service providers 
would be critical to its success, Realizing Ambition trainers participated in three training conferences. For 
the first session, the trainers were participants. In the next, they began to lead sessions with some 
guidance. Finally, in the third session, they delivered portions of the program independently. 
Case Study: Replicating Innovative Education Programs through Realising Ambition Realising 
Ambition is a program of the Big Lottery Fund, the philanthropic branch of the U.K. Lottery, which invests 
in proven and promising programs to keep youth (ages 8-14) out of the criminal justice system. This 
example of expanding innovation represents a horizontal scaling which introduces an innovative model 
into a new geographical context.. The Lions Quest Skills for Adolescence Program was identified as 
having proven success in other countries, and Realising Ambition wanted to bring it to the United 
Kingdom. It invited its membership to tender for delivering the program and selected the partners based 
on how many young people they said they could reach, their budget and their existing partnerships that 
could be leveraged. An important success factor for expansion was the organizational and financial 
support that Realising Ambition provided. The program also benefited from a professional delivery 
network with strong implementation experience. The actual features of the program were also critical. It 
focused more on relationships and context, rather than content. It helped build the needed trust by 
involving the youth, parents and teachers involved from the beginning. And, it benefited from a training 
model that focused on experiential learning. The Realising Ambition program responsible for training other 
institutions took part in three training conferences, the first as a participant, the second leading some 
sessions and the third delivering portions of the program independently. 
 
The Lions Quest Skills for Adolescence Program and Aflatoun highlight the trade-off between centralized 
control and organic diffusion. Centralized control ensures program quality and consistency, but reducing 
the speed of diffusion was adopted. Successful expansion models are usually able to balance the two. 
Despite this trade-off, compromising quality of an innovation is not a condition for achieving scale. 
Evidence suggests that it is possible to unbundle complex interventions and replicate core components 
without compromising quality (Robinson 2014). What exactly is at the core of an innovation will depend 
on the innovation and have to be assessed case-by-case through rigorous and repeated testing. Davies 
(2014) provides a potential way of distinguishing between a program or innovation’s core and surface 
elements. Fidelity to the core is defined by the four components below. 
• Targeted delivery: Delivered to those who are intended to receive it; 
• Adherence: Core components of innovation are delivered; 
• Dosage: The right volume or quantity of the intervention; and 
• Quality of delivery. 
 
The degree of centralization that Realising Ambition and Aflatoun demonstrate is not always necessary 
for the spread of innovation. However, without it, there lacks a defined system or structure, which is what 
social service providers (NGOs or governments) typically desire. An example of organic and diffuse 
expansion can be found in crowdsourcing platforms. Massachusetts-based InnoCentive, for instance, 
uses a crowdsourcing platform for solving problems in the social space. It awards prizes to social 
scientists and thinkers for their novel ideas on how to solve important problems (Rodin 2011). 
Crowdsourcing is a platform innovation, which relates more to the “how” than the “what” (Rodin 2011). 
This is opposed to a product innovation, which usually refers to something tangible, such as a solar 
panel. 
                                                       
13 Before Realising Ambitions expansion effort, Lions Club International was implementing the Lions Quest Skills for Adolescence 
program in other countries, but not the United Kingdom. 
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Crowdsourcing highlights how social innovation is a dynamic process and how adoption, adaptation and 
replication are intimately tied together and, in many cases, spreading an innovation can provide a 
platform for new complementary or supplementary innovations to be developed (Davies 2014). An open 
feedback loop that enables continuous improvement and informs future innovation is necessary (Smith 
2009). So, crowdsourcing can help identify social innovations and create a forum for improving innovative 
concepts. 
Donors should also take note of crowdsourcing’s intermediary function and its impact in connecting 
philanthropists, researchers, scientists and disadvantaged groups. While InnoCentive and similar 
companies do not have the organizational capacity to manage an innovation’s adoption at a larger scale, 
the crowdsourcing platforms have impacted how governments and international development institutions 
address social and development challenges. For instance, USAID’s Global Development Lab uses Grand 
Challenges for Development and the Development Innovation Ventures to invite individuals and 
organizations to submit innovative concepts to be tested, implemented and taken to scale. Other 
examples include the World Bank Institute — a global connector of knowledge, learning and innovation 
for poverty reduction — and the Global Innovation Fund — a partnership of USAID, U.K.’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency , 
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Omidyar Network — which uses the venture 
capital model to fund innovations that can achieve social impact at scale. 
The literature also shows that innovations tend to go to scale quicker when they are entering a market 
rather than creating a new one (Kubaznasky 2013). People are more likely to adopt an innovative product 
or service if it allows them to do something they already do but in a preferred way. This was certainly the 
case with Vodafone’s M-Pesa in Kenya, which provided mobile banking to half of a largely unbanked 
population in two years. Mobile banking replaced less convenient and more resource-draining ways to 
carry out financial transactions. The underlying need to carry out financial transactions facilitates 
achieving scale on a product innovation that works. 
In addition to responding to existing demand, M-Pesa was able to capitalize on existing distribution 
networks. Specifically, it targeted airtime dealers who sell phone credit; networked organizations, such as 
courier services or banks; and stand-alone shops. The latter was used to provide coverage in hard-to- 
reach areas or single locations that had a lot of foot traffic, such as a hospitals or retail outlets. 
The importance of leveraging existing distribution networks is also evident in the Realising Ambition 
program. To implement the innovative Lions Quest Skills for Adolescence Program, Realising Ambition 
tapped into its vast professional delivery network of schools and other organizations with experience 
implementing similar programs. Having access to actors who can disseminate the innovation cannot be 
overstated. 
The M-Pesa example also highlights one of the important roles that donors can play, which is to support 
early-stage innovations so that they can be tested, refined and ultimately ready for scale. Indeed, the 
initial £1 million grant from the DFID Innovation Fund gave M-Pesa more room to perfect its model 
because there was less pressure to cover its costs (Vaughan et al 2013). During the pilot, M-Pesa began 
to educate its customers on how to use the service and monitored behaviors to better understand how it 
could facilitate adoption. This helped M-Pesa create a product more likely to be widely adopted and build 
positive word-of-mouth around the concept. The pilot also revealed the importance of removing barriers to 
entry for potential consumers. M-Pesa achieved this by making it free to sign up and only requiring a 
national ID, which most Kenyans possess. 
One of the challenges with expanding social innovation, however, is assuming that something that works 
in one place will work in another. This is especially the case when innovation is taken to new 
geographical and cultural contexts. Randomized control trials are increasingly used to measure impact 
and determine what interventions work. The rigor of these evaluations’ methodologies provides 
policymakers with a significant degree of confidence in the impact of specific interventions. However, 
external validity is a recurring limitation of randomized control trials. Randomization bias, lack of uptake 
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from treatment groups and contamination of control groups translate into an excessive reliance on 
researchers’ assumptions and puts into question its external validity. 
To understand how a pilot project could be expanded, it is insufficient to know that it worked in one 
context. Donors must perform the due diligence of understanding the political economy of the context in 
which the innovation or pilot will be implemented. While it is tempting to devise and study pilots as a way 
of understanding what might work at scale, the act of scaling up can pose political economy obstacles 
that a small pilot does not encounter (Chandy et al 2013). Therefore, monitoring, evaluation and learning 
need to focus on the program/innovation itself and the broader context. Finally, effective monitoring and 
evaluation of scaling-up initiatives will look at the innovative program’s impact and success and assess 
the process itself. This appropriately shifts the learning from monitoring and evaluation to the actual 
process of taking that model to scale, not just the impact of that model. 
Conclusion 
In the international development arena, intermediary organizations are supposed to act as conduits 
between donors and governments and CBOs, ideally enabling donors and community organizations to 
better understand each other. They are also supposed to facilitate local-level capacity building and 
provide other means of supporting social change. 
However, the potential for intermediaries to support social change lies in their understanding of the 
systems they inhabit and their ability to affect them. To be effective, intermediaries need to be able to 
communicate well with donors, community-based groups and other partners; assess the institutional and 
programmatic needs of smaller CSOs; develop, deliver and evaluate appropriate capacity-building 
strategies; understand the implications of power relationships, governance issues and participation; 
understand donor requirements and objectives; coordinate financial and narrative reporting so that 
information and funds flow effectively to enable program activities to progress; coordinate shared learning 
and advocacy so that government and national-level actors are aware of and, where possible, involved 
with innovation; and evaluate the most promising innovations and encourage and facilitate plans to 
expand them. 
Intermediary organizations also play a critical role in the expansion of an innovation. However, they need 
to be prepared to play that role and must be a credible organization capable of bringing the various 
stakeholders to the table and to mobilize them in support of expanding of the innovation. Their credibility 
is also vital in terms of interfacing and facilitating between the originating organization (a local CBO) and 
the adopting organization (e.g., the Ministry of Education in the education sector). 
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The Organization for Community Development (OCODE) has been working in one of the poorer 
suburbs of Dar es Salaam since 1999. In partnership with the Firelight Foundation with a grant of $15,000 
OCODE set out to improve the numeracy and literacy performance of 377 slow learners in 4 schools. 
OCODE trained 20 teachers to support slow learners, provided teaching and learning materials and 
established remedial classes. Parents were encouraged to support their children's learning at school 
meetings and by SMS messaging. OCODE carried out Uwezo assessments before and after the children 
attended remedial classes in Kiswahili, English and math over a period of two terms and 90% of enrolled 
children demonstrated improved reading, writing and arithmetic skills. 
An Example of Key Findings from OCODE’s Uwezo Assessment 
 Before (%) After (%) 
Pupils who can read a story in Kiswahili 18 77 
Pupils who can read letters in English 33 97 
Pupils who pass Mathematics test 22 56 
 
OCODE reported: “Most of the children in the remedial classes were chronic absentees. Knowing how to read 
and write has provided an incentive for them to attend school as they now feel more confident and comfortable 
in classes so their school attendance has increased. Being able to read and write has improved their 
enthusiasm for studying as they understand what they are studying about and this has led to an increase 
in their general academic performance.” Other neighborhood schools were impressed by these results 
and asked OCODE to broaden its support to include them, but limited resources meant that this was not 
feasible. This experience serves to show how significant results can be achieved over a short period with 
a small amount of money. 
 
The Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA) received grants totaling $175,000 from Firelight 
Foundation to support youth groups in five communities around Mwanza. These groups were tasked with 
mobilizing and enabling parents and communities to support the numeracy and literacy skills development 
of 4,000 children from five primary schools. Although this initiative had not been formally assessed at the 
time of the evaluation, TAHEA reported that it was going exceptionally well. Communities which were 
accustomed to perceiving youth as a problem were beginning to see them as part of a solution. Young 
people were gaining leadership skills and self-confidence. Children were reported to be improving their 
numeracy and literacy skills and looked forward to attending after school classes run by youth that they 
looked up to. TAHEA also supported the youth to implement income generating activities to help them 
become independent. If the evaluation of learning outcomes confirms these reports, this seems to be a 
win-win situation that develops children’s skills, supports the emergence of young leaders and encourages 
inter-generational cooperation. In light of high youth unemployment and the urgent need for teachers in 
most African countries, there may be a lesson here about developing the skills of school leavers to 
supplement and support trained teachers. 
Safina's Women's Association (SAWA) is well established and has extended its work to Maasai 
communities in southern Tanzania. It received a grant of $20,000 from the Firelight Foundation to improve 
the learning environment of 148 children attending two Early Childhood Development (ECD) Centers and 
to establish village managed savings and loans schemes in the target communities. SAWA considered 
their most effective interventions to be: 
• Sensitization that built community capacity in managing ECD Centers and advocacy 
• Facilitating advocacy for ECD resources with key decision makers which resulted in the district 
council increasing the budget allocated for ECD at community level. 
• Facilitating economic empowerment through Village Savings and Loans, which increased 
community capacity to invest in children’s education needs 
SAWA reported that the village government provided land for construction of one ECD Centers and 
community members contributed building materials. Parents sent children to the center and provided them 
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with books and uniforms. SAWA trained paraprofessional and nursery school teachers to implement 
assessments for 60 children using ZamCAT and Uwezo tools in Swahili and English. Tools were also 
adapted to the Maasai language and the data collected was used by teachers to improve their teaching 
approaches. SAWA is the accredited trainer for Uwezo in Morogoro region and trained other Firelight 
Foundation implementing organizations to use the tools. 
The Société Internationale de Linguistique (SIL) received a grant of $59,288 from TrustAfrica to support 
the development of EMiLe, one of several approaches to bilingual education under experimentation in 
Senegal. SIL was responsible for developing a curriculum, materials and teacher’s guides for transferring 
reading skills from Serer, to French as part of the larger EMiLe program. The work took place with 1,100 
students (50% boys 50% girls) in grades 1 and 2. SIL was part of a complex and difficult partnership with 
World Vision and the National Office for Catholic Teaching, supported by local education authorities in the 
districts of Fatick and Dioffior where the project operated. The SIL team was technically skilled and highly 
committed. TrustAfrica encouraged a three year longitudinal study to gather data on changes in learning 
outcomes. The first year of the study assessed a sample of 120 students from six control schools and six 
pilot schools. The assessment covered literacy development, spoken French and mathematics and results 
were promising, showing greater improvements in the pilot schools. However EMiLe needs to have a local 
partner, as opposed to SIL, to consistently advocate and represent EMiLe’s bilingual model at discussions 
concerning the adoption of bi-lingual education that Senegal will eventually scale up to the national level. 
The Madrasa Resource Center Kenya (MRCK) received a grant of $63,000 from TrustAfrica to improve 
early literacy and school readiness for 5,000 children aged from 4 to 6 in 80 Madrasa community 
preschools. Classroom and community level interventions focused on improving teaching and learning 
practices and teachers’ tools for literacy assessment and supporting and encouraging parents’ 
participation in reading with and for their children. Early Grade Reading Assessment ( EGRA) baseline and 
end line surveys were carried out for 183 kindergarten (KG) 2 and KG 3 children, 34 
KG2 and KG3 teachers and 88 parents across 20 schools. Data was collected through child language 
ability assessment, classroom observation of teaching practices and teacher and parent interviews. 
Control groups were identified in similar ECD Centers. After a year of intervention, the endline study 
indicated positive gains in reading scores for pupils at both KG2 and KG3 levels in comparison with the 
control groups but few of the findings were statistically significant. MRCK takes the findings as an 
indication that their reading interventions have potential for enhancing reading abilities, but believes that a 
longer period of intervention is required as preschool teachers require more systematic support to master 
and apply the teaching of phonetics. In addition, the intervention needs to develop a stronger community of 
practice among teachers and community members. Through this experience MRCK also learned that their 
evaluation needed a stronger design and a more significant sample size. It is likely that teachers, pupils 
and parents in the intervention and control schools interacted on a regular basis and shared practices 
associated with the interventions. 
Link Community Development (LCD) works in Uganda to increase equitable access to quality education, 
improve the quality and relevance of primary education and the delivery of literacy for early learners. With 
a grant of $58,146, LCD worked in 16 schools, facilitating eight School Performance Reviews and training 
for 16 Literacy Teachers, 16 School Management Committee members and 16 
Parent/Teacher Association members. The project targeted 4,795 grade 1 and grade 3 students. 
Assessments were carried out by the District Department of Education. Tools included LCD’s School 
Performance Review and teacher observation using a notation grid. The baseline and the summative 
evaluations used an EGRA tool to assess progress in Runyoro and English and covered five schools with 
a sample of 24 learners from each. Two control schools were also included. Findings showed that 20 
hours’ one-to-one support for grade 1 and grade 3 teachers in the five schools that received the most 
focused literacy support saw large increases in their learners’ literacy skills over a period of seven months. 
This level of improvement was not seen in the control schools. Results were disseminated at national level 
but the approach was seen as too resource intensive by the office for education standards. However 
results confirmed that primary teachers given short term intensive classroom support alongside support for 
school management will see a more rapid increase in the literacy levels of their learners compared to those 
teachers who have no such school-based support. 
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Annex 3 – Realistic Timeline for Project Start-Up and 
Management 
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Key phases in working through 
intermediaries to test innovations 
Suggested 
time to 
allow 
 
Factors that can influence the time 
allowed 
 
Grantee start-up 
-	Hiring staff / staff induction 
-	Informing appropriate authorities 
-	Selecting implementing organizations 
-	Planning capacity building processes 
and procedures 
-	Initial workshop for implementing 
organizations 
-	Grant dispersal 
 
 
 
 
 
At least 6 
months 
-	Any preliminary research may 
require additional time 
-	The overall size of the program – a 
very large program will need more 
time. 
-	Recruitment can take longer than 
planned so it helps to identify potential 
key personnel in advance and for 
existing personnel to get start-up 
activities underway 
Implementing partner start-up 
-	Hiring staff / staff induction 
-	Organizing equipment and office 
space 
-	Discussions with other stakeholders: 
partners, local leaders, beneficiaries, 
administrative/education local authorities 
 
 
 
At least 3 
months 
 
-	The number of stakeholders affects 
the time required because discussions 
with more parties take more time. 
-	Distance and communication issues: 
remote areas or poor internet access 
will require more time 
Main implementation phase 
-	Testing and measuring the results of 
the innovation 
-	Capacity building 
-	Preparation and implementation of 
advocacy initiatives 
 
 
 
2-3 years 
 
The length of the cycle of the 
innovation concerned. An innovation 
intended to have an impact on the first 
three years of primary education 
ideally needs to run for three years 
Consolidation 
-	Writing up and sharing of results 
-	Advocacy follow-up 
-	Planning for next steps if appropriate 
 
 
6 months 
Any second phase of funding should 
pick up as quickly as possible after the 
first ends to avoid losing project staff 
and stakeholder confidence 
 
